

Женевська угода 1994 року. Стаття надає можливість глибше зрозуміти суть ядерної проблеми в Північній Кореї та дати оцінку важливості ракетно-ядерної загрози з боку КНДР.

This article describes the Korean Peninsula denuclearization problem, which is a key factor in the deterioration of relations between the Northeast Asia countries. The article analyzes first and second nuclear crisis as well as the Geneva Agreement in 1994. It gives an in-depth understanding of the essence of nuclear issue in North Korea and helps to evaluate the importance of the nuclear missile threat from North Korea.

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BLACKSEAFOR: AN ATTEMPT AT REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

This article deals with the security cooperation in the Black Sea, in the framework of the regional organization BLACKSEAFOR. The author analyzes the peculiarities of the Black Sea region building with introducing the historical context for its establishing. This is followed by an outline of the recent developments in the Black Sea states, the complexity of international relations, security challenges and military balance, thus explaining rationale behind establishing BLACKSEAFOR. Then, author characterizes new threats and challenges for the Black Sea states and gives an insight into functioning of the BLACKSEAFOR, the activities of this organization and how they corresponded to the proclaimed goals. The article concludes with present-day trends in the Black Sea region, and tries to answer the question, whether BLACKSEAFOR was an effective cooperation platform and what future prospects it might have.

The Black Sea is a region construct, which appeared on the map of the world only recently. Its analysis has been rather confined and for the most part concentrated on economic cooperation or energy transit. However, in terms of security, the region as well poses new threats and challenges.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order had specific long-lasting implications for the Black Sea region. Formerly, it had been an arena for East-West antagonism and an area of the Soviet block domination. However, after the end of the Cold War, new independent states

appeared on the shores of the Black Sea, with different levels of economic development, political regime and issues on the agenda of foreign affairs. Thus, the dynamics between them changed drastically. Shielded by the Iron Curtain before the end of the Cold War, these states for the first time fully encountered the processes of globalization and regionalization.

The Black Sea may be defined as a specific geopolitical entity, uniting six littoral states. Furthermore, countries from geographical vicinity (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova), and those having cultural affiliation (Greece) to the region, are trying to become a part of it, constituting the 'wider Black Sea region'. In the 1990s, the Black Sea remained a tumultuous region, suffering from wide range of security threats: frozen conflicts, diplomatic stand-offs and widespread political instability. It is important to see the dynamics of problems, occurring in the Black Sea region throughout 1990s, to understand, why such organization as BLACKSEAFOR was initiated, and what tensions it was intended to overcome.

The hotbeds of tension appeared almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union rigid security system. Georgia had been entangled in the series of separatist conflicts since the proclamation of independence. In 1993, Georgia essentially lost control over Abkhazia region to a combination of Abkhaz, North Caucasian and Russian irregular forces [1]. Another challenge on the Georgian territory – the conflict in South Ossetia, also with Russian involvement – conceded to a volatile ceasefire in 1992. Though the active phase of the conflict was over, the security of the country was severely endangered, and Georgia faced serious consequences in humanitarian sphere [3]. More threats to the regional stability came from Russia. The Chechen insurgency destabilized the Northern Caucasus with implications for Georgia as well, raising the risks of terrorist attacks, arms proliferation and illegal trade. The Chechen war of 1994-1996 threatened spillover of military operations, and contributed to extreme volatility in the Caucasus region [1].

Apart from the military conflicts, a plethora of bilateral relations in the Black Sea region unfolded entanglement of competitive agendas. Russia and Turkey – two biggest economies on the Black Sea – were eyeing each other as contestants rather than counterparts. Mutual distrust over support for ethnic separatists in Chechnya and Kurdistan; Russia's apprehension because of Turkish military cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, which might potentially lead to establishing NATO bases in these countries; question of naval balance and establishment of Turkish naval superiority; disagreements on the flank limitations of the CFE treaty after Russia violated its regulations in Chechnya; objections of Turkey to the Russia's role as a sole peace-keeper in the CIS and other concerns made relations

between these two states rather complicated. Though towards the end of 1990s some attempts at political rapprochement were made, essential rivalry between Russia and Turkey remained [5].

Relations between Russia and Ukraine were also full of tensions. Question of Black Sea fleet division and Russian basing rights in Crimea; destabilization of situation in Crimea insinuated from Russia; Russia's objections to Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and other Western partners; issues of delimitation and demarcation of the border – all these questions made cooperation problematic. Romania and Ukraine had rather cool diplomatic relations due to the fact that Romania refused to recognize border between two countries after Ukraine gained independence, and further on, disputed the belonging of five islands in the Danube delta and of the sea shelf around Serpent Island [5].

At the same time, despite all the differences in envisioning the Black Sea region and constructing foreign policy agenda, all the countries encountered similar security challenges, typical for the post-September 11 world – the New Security Threats (NSTs), such as terrorism, illegal arms trade and drug trafficking [8]. The presence of NATO in the Black Sea had been significant for generating common response to the NSTs and presumably, to the hard security challenges. The Partnership for Peace program was aimed at enhancing cooperation with partner states. As a part of PfP program, the countries of the Black Sea region have joined in the multinational naval peace-keeping trainings exercises 'Cooperative Partner'. Another important naval training program, 'Sea Breeze', started out as a bilateral Ukraine-USA initiative, but later was enlarged to include 10 more other countries, among which also Russia. The Ukrainian-Russian training, Peace Fairway, was exclusively bilateral and facilitated battle training and peace-keeping operations planning [7].

New and old security threats in the Black Sea region showed the necessity for buildup of common security mechanisms, and overcoming old problems in bilateral relations. It was expected, that common military collaboration project would diminish distrust over motives and long-term political goals of each of the countries and make the relations between the states more open and transparent.

With these considerations in mind, the idea of establishing a multinational naval force in the Black Sea region emerged at the meeting of Ukrainian and NATO military officials in 1997. It was supported by all the littoral states, and finally the formal initiative came from the Turkish Navy in 1998. The agreement on establishing Black Sea Naval Force was signed in Istanbul on 2 April 2001 by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine [4]. BLACKSEAFOR was tasked with search and rescue operations,

provision of humanitarian aid in natural disasters, protection of environment, removal of sea mines, counter-terrorism operations. The command rotation was established on six-monthly basis [2].

Because the vessels would not always be available due to financial restrictions and repair activities, it was agreed to activate the force at least once or twice a year during two to four weeks, and hold it in the on-call status for the rest of the year. BLACKSEAFOR was not a battle group and had no intentions of engaging in the large naval operations. There is no political body to coordinate its activities. BLACKSEAFOR was intended to accommodate harbor and sea trainings, joint port visits, and become available for UN And OSCE-mandated peace-support operations. Additionally, BLACKSEAFOR opened possibilities for consultations between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense of the littoral states [4].

The first activation ceremony was held in Golcuk and Istanbul on 27-28 September 2001, and the force conducted its first activities in September - October 2001 under Turkish command. The second activation took place in August 2002 under the command of Ukraine [4]. The activity of BLACKSEAFOR was continuous and quite successful in a way of procuring mutual trust and enhancing cooperation between the navies of the six littoral states up until year 2008 [9].

The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had crucial impact on the set of multilateral relations in the region. Careful attempts to build-up trustful relations basically failed and BLACKSEAFOR fell apart as a platform for dialogue and establishing transparency of military among the six littoral states. From that time on, Georgia refused to take part in common navy drills with Russia [2].

Though the war had great significance for the whole region, BLACKSEAFOR continued to function. Russia and Turkey found common ground soon after Georgian war, and it was a decisive step towards organizing continuation of cooperation in the framework of BLACKSEAFOR. Eventually, the navy drills resumed, and in April 2009 all BLACKSEAFOR members, excluding Georgia, carried out military exercises. The exercises were repeated in 2010 in the same way. In April 2011, to celebrate 10 years since BLACKSEAFOR funding, a naval parade was held in Turkey along the Bosphorus. At this point even Georgia sent its vessel to participate in the event. In August 2011 warships from BLACKSEAFOR states carried out naval drills, but Georgia again refused to send its ships on this occasion (Sanchez, 2012). Thus, the BLACKSEAFOR activities continued to be carried out in the constrained framework of small-scale operations, but continued to lose its role as a dialogue platform and inclusive organization.

The consequences of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 were also significant for the naval balance, as Russia showed trends for increasing its military capabilities in the Black Sea basin. The increasing in number of submarines from one to seven was planned, as well as construction of new naval ships. Also, the strategic aircraft, including TU-23M3 bombers, was to be returned to the Black Sea Fleet. The size and number of weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine was augmented, and the back-up base in Novorossiysk developed. In 2005, the Russian government approved a federal program of developing the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of the Russian Federation from 2005-2020. The estimated cost of this program is over 3 billion dollars. In 2010, the Russian government spent nearly 90 million dollars to set up the base in Novorossiysk, and funding for 2012 is estimated at 300 million dollars [6].

The rise of Russian interest in the Black Sea region and increasing the military potential has coincided with growing tensions in the Middle East. The situation in Syria and Iran diverted Turkey's attention from the northern vector of policy, and took away NATO's focus from the Black Sea region. Consequently, there was no regional power able to challenge Russian dominance in the area, and the global actors became less actively involved, even after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and worrying trends of military build-up, attempted by Russia. In this way, initiatives of military cooperation and dialogue, such as BLACKSEAFOR, became negligible. The Russian policy after 2008 generally contributed to the falling apart of the already weak regional cooperation. The recent developments in Ukraine affirm this trend, and put the sole existence of BLACKSEAFOR in its present format under doubt, as Ukrainian government started negotiating exclusion of Russia from this organization [10]. Until present moment, the functionality of the organization is frozen.

Conclusions

BLACKSEAFOR is a unique construct of regional cooperation, because it is focusing solely on military forces without political coordination and engagement. It was created as a good-will initiative, to promote openness and dialogue among the Black Sea littoral states, without aiming at ever becoming a full-fledged military alliance. But not only complex structure of regional geopolitics prevented BLACKSEAFOR from turning into a real security power. Black Sea as a region was never a top priority for any of the littoral states: Turkey was being involved in the Middle East and Central Asia, reassessing its role in the post-bipolar world; post-socialist countries tried to overcome economic crisis and political instability, focusing on the integration with NATO and the EU. Russia tried to cope with

its internal problems and returned to claiming supremacy in the region only recently.

Since the end of the 1990s NATO, actively present in the security cooperation on the Black Sea before, started to relay the main responsibility for assuring stability on its partners (mainly, Turkey). BLACKSEAFOR was initiated as a way for the littoral states to open up to each other, increase credibility and fight together with new challenges and new security threats. The type of cooperation within BLACKSEAFOR was rather confined and limited to humanitarian and search-and-rescue tasks. But that was the reason why organization started to function right after the agreement was signed, and managed to do so successfully until the August war of 2008, as the countries did not have to make political concessions.

Taking this functionalist approach, increasing cooperation of navy should have spilled-over to other fields of collaboration, and create a common ground for region-building. But it did not happen, due to the variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the littoral states and their vision of foreign policy differed greatly. Though, drastic changes the world went through since the 1990s have to be taken into account. BLACKSEAFOR was envisaged and started to function in the uni-polar world of unquestionable dominance of the USA. The Black Sea was just one of many regions in the world, where two regional powers (Turkey and Russia), approximately equal in terms of military and economy potential, outbalanced each other and strived for preserving status-quo. But since that time, major changes happened to the Black Sea states. Russia started to gain more economic weight with the rise of prices for oil and gas, which allowed it to pursue new objectives in foreign policy – dominance in the area of former Soviet Union, and primarily in the Black Sea region. Turkey's focus shifted from Europe and the Black Sea more to the Middle East, pursuing its own national interests, rather than complying with the status of a loyal NATO ally. NATO's presence in the Black Sea became far less unquestionable and far more often accepted by Turkey only reluctantly. The smaller states, in terms of both economy and military capacity, such as Ukraine and Georgia, naturally looked for an umbrella power, which would help them survive the growing distortion of regional geopolitical balance. And that power was USA and NATO, which were starting to lose their capacity to influence developments in the Black Sea, but more importantly – losing interest to do so. Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania remained rather passive in all the processes of region-building in the Black Sea. Neither able to significantly influence proceedings, nor being challenged by the changes in the region, they did not express special interest in the Black Sea regional organizations.

BLACKSEAFOR functioning was in many ways linked to the preservation of the status-quo which existed in the beginnings of the 2000s. But when it changed, and the balance in the region was distorted, the existence of common military structure is hardly possible. Finally, the major task of BLACKSEAFOR as an organization was to promote dialogue, and it managed to do so while dialogue was in the interest of key regional powers. Regarding current changes in the region, it is doubtful that transparent communication is possible or even desirable. Unfortunately, the recent developments show that the Black Sea region is returning to its former stance as an arena for geopolitical stand-off.

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Стаття присвячена дослідженню досвіду співробітництва в галузі безпеки в Чорному морі в рамках організації Блексіфор. Автор аналізує особливості виникнення Чорноморського регіону, досліджуючи складності міжнародних відносин, проблем безпеки та військового балансу, щоби привести обґрунтування виникнення Блексіфор. Далі автор характеризує нові загрози і виклики для країн Чорного моря і дає уявлення про функціонування Блексіфор. Стаття завершується переглядом сучасних тенденцій в Чорноморському регіоні і спробою відповісти на питання, чи був Блексіфор ефективною платформою співпраці і які майбутні перспективи він може мати.

Статья посвящена исследованию опыта сотрудничества в сфере безопасности в Черном море в рамках организации Блэксифор. Автор анализирует особенности возникновения Черноморского региона, исследуя сложности международных отношений, проблем безопасности и военного баланса, чтобы привести обоснования возникновения Блэксифор. Далее автор характеризует новые угрозы и вызовы для стран Черного моря и дает представление о функционировании Блэксифор. Статья завершается обзором современных тенденций в Черноморском регионе и попыткой ответить на вопрос, были ли Блэксифор эффективной платформой сотрудничества и какие будущие перспективы он может иметь.

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