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Зміст

Introduction	8
Chapter 1 The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalisation, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred	9
Links 1.	25
Chapter 2. Religion and Politics: Integration, Separation and Conflict	33
Links 2.	45
The conclusions.....	47

Introduction

The model of secularism as the overarching framework for managing the relationship between religion and politics has come under increasing scrutiny in recent International Relations (IR) scholarship, particularly in the wake of the so-called “postsecular turn”. Where once religion was thought to be an entity that was easily identifiable, definable and largely irrelevant to politics and public life, these assumptions are being increasingly brought into question. This special issue makes a specific contribution to this recent questioning of secularism within IR by noting and interrogating the multiple ways in which the boundaries between the religious and the political blur in contemporary politics. Our contributors explore the multifarious dimensions of this critical issue by asking whether the relationship between religion and politics has taken on significant new forms and dimensions in our contemporary globalised age or if we are simply beginning to recognise a pattern that has always been present. In this introduction we canvass some of the parameters of current debates on the religious and the political. We note that there are multiple and (at times) competing understandings of such key terms as religion, secularism, secularisation and the post-secular that shape and are shaped by ongoing discussions of the relationship between religion and public life. Our goal is not to close down these important points of difference through the imposition of singular understandings. We simply wish to highlight the points of contestation that continue to be significant for how we understand (or obscure) the boundaries between the religious and the political.

Chapter 1

The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalisation, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred

Questions concerning the place of religion in politics and public life have taken on renewed significance in numerous contexts in the twenty-first century, particularly within the discipline of international relations (IR). Despite the enduring influence of religion in the international sphere, discussion of religion in IR is often still influenced by a notable 'secular bias', 'the unquestioned acceptance of the secularist division between religion and politics'.¹ Yet, the dominance of this secularist bias is increasingly being challenged and scholars are beginning to explore alternative ways of conceptualising the relationships between the religious and the political. This special issue makes a specific contribution to this recent turn within IR by noting and interrogating the multiple ways in which the boundaries between the religious and the political blur in contemporary politics. Our contributors explore the multifarious dimensions of this critical issue by asking whether the relationship between religion and politics has taken on significant new forms and dimensions in our contemporary globalised age or if we are simply beginning to recognise a pattern that has always been present. Are the contributions to substantive political issues by religious actors a new development, a reclaiming of a past heritage or, in fact, the result of a recognition by scholars and practitioners alike that secularism does not have a monopoly on the best ways in which to approach the key questions related to collective human existence? Our contributors offer answers to these and other related questions, examined across diverse cultural and political settings at the local, national, regional and global levels. In this way, this special issue further contributes to the important task of moving IR beyond its traditional secular, state-based frameworks for analysis.

In this introduction we canvass some of the parameters of current debates on the religious and the political. We note that there are multiple and (at times) competing understandings of such key terms as religion, secularism, secularisation and the post-secular that shape and are shaped by ongoing discussions of the

relationship between religion and public life. Our goal is not to close down these important points of difference through the imposition of singular understandings. We simply wish to highlight the points of contestation that continue to be significant for how we understand (or obscure) the boundaries between the religious and the political.

IR scholars have generally ignored or downplayed the extensive Judeo-Christian influences within IR's foundations by proclaiming it a secular discipline, with notable recent exceptions.² Despite the important work by contemporary scholars questioning IR's secular basis, these findings have yet to truly penetrate into mainstream IR. This has led to a lack of self-reflexivity on the part of Western scholars regarding the level of religious influence in their own political contexts.³ Further, it has contributed to an inability amongst many IR scholars to achieve a nuanced analysis of the religious and the political, frequently missing the multiple ways in which religion and politics are mutually constitutive, even in supposedly secular Western political contexts. When Fred Halliday points to the English School's 'fetishisation' of the Westphalian system to explain the way in which English School scholars can overlook the violence that was necessary for that system to spread across the world,⁴ we too can look at a certain 'fetishisation' of the Treaty of Westphalia to explain the omission of religious discussion in IR.

The common narrative holds that the peace treaty ended decades of religious wars which had erupted in Europe over doctrinal differences between Protestants, Catholics and Calvinists in the wake of the Reformation. The Peace of Westphalia recognised the imperative to divorce the powers of the state from the duty to uphold any particular faith.⁵ In this narrative, Westphalia is viewed as the instigation of the gradual process of functional differentiation between the state and religion which evolved and deepened in the following centuries. Yet even though it needed both philosophical and political revolutions in order to fully establish this differentiation within the newly emerging states,⁶ the Peace of Westphalia seemed to have successfully expelled religion as a source, ostensibly, of violent strife from the interactions between states.

This reading of history thus suggests that the emergence of the sovereign state helped to solve the problem of violence for religious reasons, first externally, and later internally. The argument that secularism arose in response to religious violence is contested by William T. Cavanaugh who argues that the religious wars 'were in fact themselves the birth pangs of the state'.⁷ The religious wars were essential in creating not only territorial sovereignty but the 'very creation of religion as a set of privately held beliefs' which was necessary for 'new states ... to secure absolute sovereignty over its subjects'.⁸ Cavanaugh directs us to recognise that the wars of religion were not fought by 'pastors and peasants, but kings and nobles with a stake in the outcome of the movement towards the centralized and hegemonic state'.⁹ Assuming that the processes of secularisation arose in order to prevent bloodshed obscures the transference of power that occurs with secularisation whilst blinding us to the reality that in the era of the modern state violence has increased: 'the separation of the church from power did nothing to staunch the flow of blood'.¹⁰ Casanova argues that despite the separation between church and politics in Europe, the period between 1914 and 1989 was the most violent and bloody for centuries and was the 'product of modern secular ideologies'.¹¹ Reading the process of secularisation as a device to end warfare projects 'religion' as a threat to internal and external security, to the extent that security is associated implicitly with secularisation.¹² Religion thus becomes a dangerous threat the moment it 'goes public'.¹³

Originating in Europe in the seventeenth century, the Westphalian idea of self-determination eventually became a global principle in the era of colonial independence in the second half of the twentieth century, the 'terminus of the long campaign of the state to capture the territory of the globe'.¹⁴ In this way, the dominant assumption, or myth, of Westphalia 'creating' an international society consolidated 'a normative divergence between European international relations and the rest of the international system'.¹⁵ With this normative divergence in place, to achieve independence from colonial masters was to *de facto* embrace the European

form of IR in order to 'join' the international system. Embracing IR in the European mould also implied a tacit acceptance of secularism.

Casanova argues that the philosophy of secularism is 'to turn the particular Western Christian historical process of secularization into a universal teleological process of human development from belief to unbelief'.¹⁶ However, he argues that far from being a singular universal secularism there are competing and diverse secularisms that are not simply replicated and reproduced in Europe much less the non-Western world. Casanova claims that non-Western, particularly colonial states

are more likely to recognize the European process of secularization for what it truly was, namely, a particular Christian and post-Christian historical process, and not, as Europeans like to think, a general universal process of human or societal development.¹⁷

Much as the state system is viewed as value neutral in IR, so too is secularism. However, as the neutrality of the state is being questioned in IR, it follows that the neutrality of secularism is close behind, and this forms one of the common assumptions of the contributors to this issue.

This narrative has been probed by several authors who claim that this 'simple, arresting, and elegant image'¹⁸ is nothing more than an invented template which is used to denote state sovereignty in contemporary IR theory but does not capture the historic complexities of the seventeenth century. Rather, the principles of autonomy and territoriality, which characterise the sovereign state, are in fact a product of nineteenth- and twentieth-century political and legal thought¹⁹ and have been violated and compromised time and again in international history.²⁰ However, with regard to religion, the 'fetishisation' of the Westphalian Peace still serves a powerful argument to exclude religion from politics in order to avoid violent strife. It is in this logic that Barak Mendelson sees religion as 'prominent in the current assault on the Westphalian order',²¹ and it is this prominent envisioning of the Westphalian system that constitutes such 'fetishisation'. Turan Kayaoglu, for example, highlights the treaty of Westphalia as perpetuating a European exceptionalism, which idealises 'the European and Western order and elevates its

ideals in International Relations scholarship'.²² European exceptionalism refers to the prominence of secular ideals, much in the way Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito use the work of Charles Taylor and Scott Thomas to point to the 'turning of secularism into a condition of possibility for IR, rather than an object of its enquiry'.²³

The European exceptionalism, which elevates European ideals over others, also functions to create hierarchies between religions so that secularisation is a 'process of disseminating the ethos, ethics, cosmology, and quotidian practices of hegemonic religions across secular societies, not simply sequestering religion'.²⁴ Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Saba Mahmood reflect that 'secularism does not merely organize the place of religion in nation-states ... but also *stipulates* what religion is and ought to be'.²⁵ Through secularisation 'religion' thus becomes 'Protestantized'²⁶ whereby all other 'religions' that do not fit neatly into what religion 'ought to be' become subordinate and problematic.

Using the example of the French ban on the veil, Brown et al. argue that under the Protestantised conception of religion the French ban does 'not violate the religious liberty of Muslims because it does not intervene in anyone's beliefs (the proper locus of religion); the ban merely limits the public expression of those beliefs'.²⁷ However, using the example of Islam, the authors outline that non-Protestant religions do not necessarily hold private belief to be the primary factor. In Islam and other religions, outward behaviour and norms not only signify internal belief, but are necessary in constituting them through performative actions.²⁸ Thus secularisation not only privileges the non-religious public sphere over the private sphere of belief, but creates a hierarchy of religions derived from the perceived public/private distinction.

Acknowledging and appreciating the continuing religious influence in much Western political theory facilitates our engagement with alternative, non-Western, often religiously inspired, theoretical perspectives on global politics. Non-Western religious articulations of the political chafe under the self-imposed boundaries of the discipline; Dipesh Chakrabarty expands on the idea of boundaries when he

states that secularism is simply one of the 'relations that articulate hierarchy through practices of direct and explicit subordination of the less powerful by the more powerful'.²⁹

In one particular example of Chakrabarty's hierarchy, political Islam derives from a cultural and religious background that never experienced the kind of Reformation that occurred in Europe. Religion in the Middle East developed within a particular social, economic and political milieu that influenced, and was influenced by, prevailing structures and organising assemblages of various empires which based their political legitimacy on Islam itself. Readings of religion within this historical and geographical context deny a *strict* separation of religion and politics as one legitimates the other, though that is not to claim that there is uniformly *no* separation of religion and politics with regard to Islamic polities. James Piscatori, for example, points towards *ijma' al-fi'l*, consensus of action, to highlight the pluralism in Muslim positions *vis-à-vis* politics³⁰; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori argue that a separation between religion and state occurred after the passing of the Rightly Guided Caliphs,³¹ while Ira Lapidus claims this separation is marked by the resistance to Abbasid Caliph Ma'mun's imposition of Mu'tazilite theology in the ninth century AD.³² One might also argue, along the lines of Ali Abd al-Raziq, that the separation between politics and religion was present at the very genesis of Islam.³³ What these varied, if at times overlapping positions demonstrate, is that political Islam poses an ideal location to discuss the persisting intersection of religion and politics in ways alternative to the 'Westphalian narrative'.

Expanding from a panel at the British International Studies Association-International Studies Association joint conference in Edinburgh 2012, this special issue explores the complex relationships and categorisations of religion and the political. The story of the failed predictions of secularisation theory has become a familiar refrain in academic scholarship for over two decades³⁴ and scholars are now taking up the important task of theorising new ways for understanding the

complex and, at times, opaque relationship between religion and politics, public and private, sacred and profane.

The problems of secularisation theory have become so recognised in academic literature that it is argued we have entered into an era of an emergent post-secularism.³⁵ This emerging era grants the opportunity to ask what new tools are available for scholars in IR and other social sciences to make sense of the contemporary relationships of politics and religion in a post-secular environment.

Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito have identified two broad usages of the term 'post-secularism'. First, post-secularism can be used as a descriptive term to account for the 'resilience' of religion in the modern (or post-modern) industrial era, which entails attempts to 'go beyond secularization theory' to incorporate religions' sustained role in society.³⁶ Philip S. Gorski et al. warn that 'we should be wary' of employing the term post-secularism as simply the idea of the 'resurgence of religion'.³⁷ The idea that religion would somehow decrease or fade away is simply not supported by empirical evidence. Peter L. Berger for instance argues less for the return of religion, and more for its continuation and escalation.³⁸

As such, it is the second reading of post-secularism that is of the greatest interest and holds the most potential for contributors in this issue. The second usage of post-secularism is arguably a radical critique of secularisation theory itself, prompted by the idea that 'values such as democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion, and justice may not necessarily be best pursued within an exclusively immanent secular framework. Quite the opposite, the secular may well be a potential site of isolation, domination, violence and exclusion.'³⁹ Moreover, Jürgen Habermas has posited that in secularisation – by deliberately excluding, ignoring or downplaying religion – modern society has potentially lost a vital moral resource.⁴⁰ The German constitutional lawyer Böckenförde has summed up the significance of religion and religious orientations in his famous formula that the modern state exists on foundations which it cannot guarantee by itself.⁴¹ By excluding religion, secular society becomes impoverished.

Entering into a discourse regarding post-secularism does not imply that all contributors accept that previously there was a distinct divide between the secular and the sacred, but merely suggests that contemporary theories regarding post-secularism allow for a more nuanced engagement regarding politics and religion in scholarly research without being theoretically marginalised. Before the end of the Cold War, dominant theories in IR accepted the Enlightenment argument that with increased industrialisation, rationalisation and modernisation the world would become 'disenchanted'.⁴² This argument holds that modern society would no longer 'have recourse to magical means',⁴³ for the scientific era meant that 'one can, in principle, master all things by calculation'.⁴⁴ The assumption being made here is that it is impossible to be both rational and religious, as exemplified by Weber:

To the person who cannot bear the fate of our times like a man ... The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him ... One way or another he has to bring his 'intellectual sacrifice' – that is inevitable.⁴⁵

Yet this perspective is based on several key assumptions that this special issue aims to destabilise – whether politics and religion were ever neatly separated; whether secular politics is 'rational' and religion 'irrational'; if 'rational' and 'irrational' are useful concepts in understanding the intersections between religion and politics; whether distinct spheres of public and private life are accurate reflections of contemporary post-secular politics.

This is not to suggest that the Peace of Westphalia was *logically* secularist in this sense (certainly, few of its architects were in any sense anti-religion), but rather that it militates in favour of a political structure that practically and politically devalued religion with reference to the domain of the political. A crucial element of territorial authority was the right to designate the religion of state. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 granted a prince the authority to declare the religion of the territory of his rule. However, the 1648 Treaty of Osnabrück formally introduced the concept of religious toleration and the re-positioning of religion to the private sphere. The treaty stated, 'Subjects who in 1627 had been debarred

from the free exercise of their religion, other than that of the ruler, were by the Peace granted the right of conducting private worship'.⁴⁶ While the prince's authority was determined by his claim to rule through divine mandate, the Peace of Westphalia began to espouse the idea that religion belonged in the private domain and severely limited the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire. Leo Gross argues that the Peace of Westphalia:

marked Man's abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new system characterised by the co-existence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or organisation above the sovereign state is no longer.⁴⁷

The framework of contemporary Western nation-states developed gradually from the components of the Peace of Westphalia. The critical elements of the Peace concerned sovereignty over a bounded territory and the privatisation of religion. It is now presumed that the individual is incorporated into one political assemblage which is 'unaffected by any other affiliations'.⁴⁸ Many Western theorists of nation-states presuppose secularism (as a normative concept) for the nation-state framework, which is based on Western experience, but may not in reality be a necessary component to the nation-state model.

While some scholars held that modernisation would lead to the extinction of religion, others held more moderate views that sacred values 'have retreated from public life ... into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations'.⁴⁹ The re-placing of religion into the private sphere has not only theoretically separated religion from politics, but also devalued it, in that the public sphere is seen as politically superior to the private. The consequence of placing religion in the private domain has been that religion is 'seen as a private matter or a group interest subordinate to what happens at the political level'.⁵⁰ However, Casanova argues that there is a 'deprivatisation' of religion, whereby 'religions' are refusing to 'accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity and secularization reserved for them'.⁵¹ In fact, Casanova states that despite the

assumption that modernity will inevitably necessitate the decline of belief, with the one exception of Western Europe, religion has either grown or stabilised.⁵² Cecelia Lynch, taking a post-Weberian perspective, echoes Casanova in claiming that

Weberian predictions that traditions based on 'magic' would give way to 'rationalized' world religions have not come to pass. Instead, technology and science intersect with human rights and tradition to create enduring yet dynamic relationships between local and world religions. These relationships continue to highlight the unstable nature of distinctions among religious traditions, with important implications for the religious/secular binary.⁵³

Based on the evidence of Western Europe alone, secularisation has been viewed as an unstoppable trend, where religion, at most, would remain a social force only in less developed societies.⁵⁴ It is this separation of the public and private – and religion's relegation to the latter domain – that informs this collection's understanding of secularism: a general undermining of religious beliefs so that 'religion diminishes in social significance',⁵⁵ and/or temporal matters dominate over sacred conceptions.

However in the late twentieth century, mainstream secularisation theory was undermined, and alongside it the dominant theories within IR. Much of this is a consequence of the Iranian Revolution's impact on Western political thinking at a critical juncture in the emergence of Anglo-American theorising about the nature of IR. This was compounded by the fall of the Soviet Union, which dislocated most of the established interpretations of IR that had grown up during the Cold War. Daniel Philpott notes that the challenge of 11 September 2001 to the United States did 'not arise from great powers or state quests for security or any state at all'.⁵⁶ The events of 11 September 2001 therefore highlighted a substantial gap in dominant theoretical frameworks in IR with respect to religion.

Consequently there is a need to reassess the long-assumed conception that religion is absent from or irrelevant to IR, but in ways that go beyond the Clash of Civilization thesis,⁵⁷ and engages in the links between secularisation, post-secularisation and 'religious innovation'.⁵⁸ The term 'religion' is both a

commonplace within this collection and deeply problematic. Within Western scholarship it is often infused with secularised meaning shaped largely by Protestant theological concepts – that is, as a private practice or belief in the sacred.⁵⁹ In this way the terms ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ can only be understood by reference to their opposites.⁶⁰ Nor can it be stated that religion is a matter of individual consciousness as many ‘religious’ systems are ‘less matters of private belief than public practice ... They are rituals that constitute various forms of community life’.⁶¹

Furthermore, ‘religion’ in this collection of articles should not be thought of as an essentialist category, but one that is consciously, and unconsciously, innovative and manipulated by state and non-state actors, both secular and faith-based. Religion is not simply concerned with supernatural entities and the nature and existence of a transcendental realm. It is also, crucially, a framework through which to interpret and respond to immanent contexts, events and experiences.⁶² Through symbolism, rhetoric, images, narratives, histories, myths, values and experiences, religious ideas and influences continue to intervene in, and unsettle, the supposedly ordered rational nature of secular politics.

Failing to interrogate the foundations of the secularist bias in IR analysis risks classifying political acts undertaken by religious adherents as ‘religious’ rather than ‘political’. By moving such actors out of the realm of politics and deeming them apolitical beings, their actions move beyond the lens of critical political enquiry. Alternatively, ‘religious’ understandings are at times undermined in favour of political or ethnic understandings of the groups that use them. Significant works regarding ‘political Islam’⁶³ emphasise political pragmatism over religious rhetoric, claiming that politics in general overrides religious influences and often specifically claim nationalism as the determining factor. For example, Olivier Roy argues that ‘the paradox of political Islam is that if the role of Islam is defined by the state, it means that political power is above any independent religious authority, and thus that Islam is subordinate to politics’.⁶⁴

Other theories accentuate the importance of ethnicity or race rather than religion in political movements such as V.D. Sāvarkar's argument that the Hindutva movement is racial rather than merely a political element of Hinduism:

Hindutva is not identical with what is vaguely indicated by the term Hinduism. By an 'ism' it is generally meant a theory or a code more or less based on spiritual or religious dogma or creed. Had not linguistic usage stood in our way then 'Hinduness' would have certainly been a better word than Hinduism as a near parallel to Hindutva. Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race.⁶⁵

In the above cases the term 'religious' is underemphasised and subsumed under other criteria. In this special issue, each article explores the often-missed dynamic between religion and politics that not only broadens the category of the political, but additionally sheds light on what can be considered religious.

The intertwining of politics and religion is not a new phenomenon. Prior to the treaties of Westphalia, religion and politics were 'profoundly mingled'⁶⁶ while the Westphalian model itself was in part a product of a dialogue between Christian theology and political theory, causing Daniel Philpott to argue 'no Reformation, no Westphalia'.⁶⁷

It is important at this juncture to touch on existing concepts that have aided contributors to this journal, and scholars in general, in their explorations of the boundaries between the religious and the political: most particularly the concepts of *political religion* and *civil religion*. David Westerlund for instance has noted that religion's subordination to politics in secular societies has laid it open as a 'societal resource', arguing that 'civil religion has developed, where religious symbols and practices are used politically to foster national integration'.⁶⁸ In this respect, civil religion is primarily a concept for exploring the interactions between the religious and the political within democratic states. By contrast, political religion is typically used to refer to the practices of totalitarian states, where the state itself becomes the object of worship.⁶⁹ Both concepts highlight a dominant trend within prevailing scholarship on the religious and the political: a

predominantly state-based focus. Religion can impart legitimacy to prevailing values and practices, by providing a shared framework within which the day-to-day practice of politics can be conducted.

Conversely, pluralist theory teaches us that religion may serve as an essentially private resource for political and social criticism.⁷⁰ Kant's conception of pluralism is itself protected by the liberal state but only truly exists at the private level: 'in the public sphere, the state itself is the ultimate good ... it defends and imposes a particular set of goods ... which excludes its rivals'.⁷¹ Thus, religion either legitimises and supports the state or serves as a private critique.

A large swathe of work, particularly since the events of September 11, has concentrated on militant political religions aimed at revolutionising state structures.⁷² Elizabeth Hurd comments that 'in recent years religious fundamentalism and religious difference have emerged as crucial factors in international conflict, national security, and foreign policy'.⁷³ Arguably, the recognition of the importance of these phenomena began to emerge with the end of the Cold War. Scholars were no longer solely focused on the ideological contest between the USSR and the USA. Neither were political relationships configured through this overarching bipolar framework. The absence of this framework enabled scholars to observe new forms of the political, and along with them new relationships between the religious and the political. In this respect, Mark Juergensmeyer's work on religious nationalism was an important milestone.⁷⁴ It remains to be seen if the so-called 'religious revival' is a new phenomenon post-Cold War and thus representing a substantive shift (as Juergensmeyer suggests) or if the conditions of globalisation and the end of bipolarity have allowed previously unnoticed phenomena to come to the fore. The connection between religion and nationalism for instance was hotly debated in Islam at the turn of the twentieth century,⁷⁵ while Partha Chatterjee noted the importance of religion in the creation of Third World nationalisms.⁷⁶ Yet what each of these approaches retains is the focus on the nation-state. What other more recent events, such as 9/11, have highlighted is the increasing importance of the non-state actor.

In an era of globalisation, while the state retains a central role in international politics, it is difficult to deny that other political formations are emerging (and have already emerged) to play a significant role in an increasing plurality of political options that notably increase the role of non-state actors. There is a recognised escalating role of non-government organisations, lobby groups, multinational corporations and social movements: all of which have been recognised (albeit at times grudgingly) as political players in mainstream IR theory in, for example, the globalisation thesis⁷⁷ and, more recently, the Arab Spring.⁷⁸ Yet mainstream IR analysis concerning the role of religion within these new political entities has been slim, with notable exceptions, such as Marty and Appleby's voluminous Chicago Fundamentalisms project.⁷⁹ The increase of non-state actors not only allows for new players to enter the stage but also changes the stage itself. What is political is being expanded from the narrow boundaries of the state to other domains that are not necessarily privatised and non-political. These new stages may be transnational, criss-crossing state boundaries, or more localised sub-national spheres.

The issue of the secular and sacred is approached in this issue through three different yet interrelated lenses: territory and nationalism; non-state political actors, and; the public/private distinction.

Territory is one way in which we see the tensions between religion and politics play out. As Peter Mandaville notes, '[b]y locating "the political" within the state, conventional IR theory reproduces a set of political structures unsuited to circumstances in which political identities and processes configure themselves across and between forms of political community'.⁸⁰ Jeffery Herbst echoes this point when he argues that alternatives to the state are not possible 'because the international community has been so conservative in recognizing the viability of alternatives'.⁸¹ While the conditions of globalisation create new (or unleash old⁸²) possibilities for political affiliation beyond and separate from the state, a constant assumption in IR is that supra-national organisations, for example, possess a secular outlook. As communities take a more prominent role in

IR, *religious* communities represent a particular locus for debating and resituating the place of the secular and the sacred.

The state's continued central role in global politics is not being denied within this special issue. The articles by both Claudia Baumgart-Ochse and Samantha May offer innovative insights on the significant role that religion retains in shaping state identity. David Ingram problematises the assumptions of state secularism in contexts where secularity itself may be better considered as secularities in the plural, owing to high degrees of religious affiliation and religious diversity, as in the case of Indonesia. All three articles emphasise the ways in which religious symbolism (specifically territorial) and language legitimise state enterprises and help form political identities. These insights directly relate to Erin Wilson's argument, via Jürgen Habermas, in this issue that religious reasoning and language have a power to articulate and convey moral and political messages in a way that secular language alone does not.⁸³ As we have seen above, religious legitimisation is a direct reversal of the political logic of the Westphalian state that assumes that it is the secular, 'rational' concept of the state itself which grants legitimacy.

Territory in the above articles is conceived both within and external to the framework of the Westphalian state. Territory becomes more than a delineated geography and becomes sacred ground used to formulate an otherwise diverse political community, as in the case of Israel, but also to delegitimise the 'Other' on both national and religious terms. Internally, religious understandings of geography can be utilised to resist the actions of the state, as seen in the Israeli settler movements, but also to de-legitimise the Other's claim to the same territory, exemplified by religious Zionist claims to Eretz Israel and Islamist claims to a Muslim Palestine. These examples challenge existing notions of national territory in that religious symbolism does not belong solely to the nation but to the wider religious community.

Crucially, non-state political actors and institutions are becoming visibly more important and are having a powerful impact on the structures and practices of

politics and society, including religion. Yet, religion's relationship with these new political entities has not been adequately addressed in dominant IR literature.

To begin addressing these questions at a broad transnational level, Faiz Sheikh explores the intersections of the religious and the political in the super-state entity of the European Union (EU) in the context of the imagined global *umma*. Erin Wilson's article on faith-based actors and Matthew John Paul Tan's work on the political dimensions of prayer contribute to our understanding of how certain religious practices constitute political actors and actions, wittingly or unwittingly. While the contributors do not neglect the continued significance of the state in this special issue, the aim is to extend beyond state-centric theories to explore the ways in which religion is entangled in political formations that currently remain outside dominant IR articulations. Importantly, religion extends the boundaries of the political – what is political is continually challenged and reshaped through the language and symbolism of religion which continues to influence the public sphere, while religion, in turn, is reshaped and challenged in the same process.

Therefore, a third thread through which this issue attempts to trace these debates is the idea of a public and a private sphere. The complete separation of religion and politics implied by the public/private distinction does not provide an accurate reflection of social and political reality. Thus, while exploring the dynamics of the religious and the political in contemporary IR, this collection also, by necessity, problematises the divisions of the public and private spheres. Each author engages with this categorisation in different ways, but each notes that this division is somewhat arbitrary and largely a Western cultural construct, challenging in regions outside of the West and becoming more visibly problematic within Western liberal secular societies. For Wilson, the distinction between public and private that influences much of the debate on the post-secular derives from the work of Jürgen Habermas. Wilson notes that 'non-belief is no longer the default position and is itself considered one option among many', arguing that the plurality of options available has allowed religion to gain ground as a form of political activism to challenge the power and legitimacy of the state.⁸⁴ Building on the work

of Wilson's article, John Rees discusses not the form religion takes in IR, but rather the means by which religion articulates itself in the international sphere. Rees argues that if the discipline is capable of understanding religion in its own language, without the need to 'translate' it into secular discourse, IR can attribute a structural dimension to religion. If Habermas challenges us to think of the ways religion can engage in public debate, Tan responds to this challenge by positing that prayer is a critique of the prevailing political order, and perhaps a political theory unto itself.

The categories of political and civil religion both focus predominantly on the state as the main political structure. This collection takes up the call from Daniel Philpott that if IR scholars and political scientists wish to understand the place of religion in the world better, they need to engage with theology. Wilson emphasises the metaphysical frameworks that faith-based actors employ when critiquing existing political frameworks, while Tan employs theology to challenge prevailing assumptions that prayer is a purely spiritual rather than also a social and political act. Baumgart-Ochse takes seriously the impact that Orthodox Judaism has had in rearticulating contemporary religious Zionism (alongside a simultaneous 'secular' Zionism), while May outlines the transnational consequences of understanding Palestine as Islamic territory based on Quranic terminology.

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Chapter 2.

Religion and Politics: Integration, Separation and Conflict

Both religion and politics have one common goal: that is to acquire political power and use it to fulfill their aims. However, to achieve this object, their methods are different. Religion mobilizes religious sensibilities of people in order to get their support to capture power; while politics uses intrigue, diplomacy, and makes attempt to win public opinion either democratically, if the system allows it, or usurps power with the help of army, if the society is under-developed and backward.

Therefore, in power struggle, both politics and religion make attempts to undermine each other. If religion holds political authority, its ambition is to exploit it to fulfill a divine mission. It claims that it derives authority from divinity and therefore its mission is holy, motivated to reform society under the spiritual guidance. Politics, on the contrary, bereft of any value, directs its policy on the needs and requirements of society whereupon, it obliges to change laws and system of government accordingly. This is a basic difference between two approaches of religion and politics:

- Religion determines its authority on divine laws which could not be changed with human intervention;
- While in pragmatic political approach society should move ahead, change and adjust itself with the new arising challenges of time.

In its secular approach man is responsible to determine his destiny. He is not under the control of divinity to remain submissive and inactive. On the contrary, he is supposed to initiate and plan to build a society according to his vision.

There are three models in history related to religion and politics.

- In one when religion and politics both unite with each other in an attempt to monopolize political power. We call it integration and sharing model.

- In the second model, politic, after subduing and overpowering religion, uses it for its interests. In this model religion plays subservient role to politics.

- In the third model both come into conflict with each other that subsequently lead their separation. In this model they appear as rivals and compete to struggle for domination.

The study of beginning and spread of any religion shows that every religion is started in particular space and time; therefore, main focus of its teachings is the solution of existing problems. However, with the change of time there are new challenges and a religion has to respond them for its survival. In this process, it has to adjust its teachings according to changes. With the passage of time, a stage comes when a religion fails to respond challenges of its time and finds hardly any space to adjust according to new environments. For example, in case of Islam, it took nearly two and a half centuries to complete its orthodoxy. Once the process was complete, it became impossible for orthodoxy to give any place to new ideas and new thinking. It was believed that any change in the structure would weaken its base. On this plea it persists to retain its old structure without any addition.

At this stage there remain three options for any religion:

- 1. Avoid and disapprove any change in its structure. If any attempt is made to reinterpret its teachings, such attempts either is crushed politically or with the help of religious injunctions (fatawa in case of Islam). Those who claim to reconstruct religious thoughts; they should be condemned as enemies of religion and believers should be warned to boycott them and not listen to their views.

- 2. In the second option, religion has a choice to adapt itself according to the needs of time and accept new interpretation relating to its teachings and accommodating modernity.

- 3. In the third option, if religion fails to respond to the challenges and feels insecure, it withdraws from the active life and decides not to entangle in worldly affairs. It confines its activities to spirituality.

The helplessness of religion is obvious in the present circumstances in which scientific and technological inventions are rapidly changing the society and its character making it more complex and mechanical. Especially, with the extension of knowledge, politics, economics, sciences, technology and other branches of knowledge assume a separate entity that could be specialized and handled by professionals. Ulema or religious scholars are not in a position to understand intricacies of these professions and adjust them with religious teachings. This is the reason why in some societies religion is separated from politics and economics and it no more enjoys the domination over the society, which it did in the medieval period.

The characteristic of three reactions may be defined as aggressive, compromising, and separatist respectively.

There are groups of people in every society who want change in their practical life but at the same time they desire not to abandon religion. These people become supporters of new interpretation of religion that suits their way of life. It causes emergence of new sects. Therefore, we find that in every religion, there are new sects, which fulfill the demands of a group of people within a span of time and then disappear in oblivion of history. However, some sects persist and survive. For example, in the Christianity, when bourgeoisie wanted religious sanction of interest, Calvin (d.1594) a religious reformer, allowed it on the basis of religion. It removed business hurdles and the merchant and industrial classes flourished. R.H. Tawney, in his classical book 'Religion and Rise of Capitalism' rightly says, « *Calvin did for the bourgeoisie of the sixteenth century what Marx did for the proletariat of the nineteenth...* »

In the Islamic history, conflict between religion and politics settled after the Abbasid revolution (750.A.D.) when the Iranians, who made the revolution a success and subsequently assumed position of power and authority in the government administration, formulated the state policy of their liking. They wanted to make the Abbasid Caliph just like the Persian monarch having absolute political power with religious authority: a combination of temporal and spiritual

powers. The Iranian bureaucracy was opposed by ulema who strove to curtail the power of the caliph in view of the shariat (religious laws). As the Iranians had political and military support, they cornered ulema in their efforts and made the caliph a Persian king along with all royal symbols and rituals which once prevailed at the Sassanid court. However, it was settled that in practice the caliph would remain absolute in administrative and political matters but he would not interfere in the affairs of the shariat nor would make any effort to change it. It would remain the domain of ulema. It is how religion and politics separated with each other in the early stage of Islamic history.

As a result of this settlement, a system emerged in which the ruler had unlimited power. Professional bureaucracy to administer the state and its affairs supported him. Ulema joined the state as qazi (judge), mufti (interpreter of law), muhtasib (ombudsman) and as imam (prayer leader). In these capacities they became servants of the state and as such their responsibility was to obey ruler and state and interpret shariat according to the interest of the caliph. Once the economic interest of the ulema were linked to the state as they received either stipends or jagir (fief) from the state, their main concern was to please the ruler. On the other hand, rulers also adopted a policy of conciliation toward them. They showed outward respect to them; invited them to their court to deliver sermons and ask for their advice on important issues. However, whenever, they wanted to use these ulema for their political interest; they asked them to issue fatwa in their favour, which they obliged with pleasure. We find that how these ulema religiously justified the Persian court ceremonies of prostration before the ruler, kissing his feet or hands and address him with high-sounding titles. They also helped rulers if they wanted to avoid religious duties such as obligatory daily prayers and fasting in the month of Ramazan. To get sexual pleasure, rulers got religious sanction by ulema to marry and divorce as they liked and to keep as many slave girls as they wished. During the Abbasid period, as the power of the Caliph increased, influence of ulema decreased and they ultimately became subservient to the ruler and his whims.

With the decline of the Abbasids, provincial ruling dynasties emerged and introduced the institution of the sultanate (kingship). Muslim jurists justified it on the plea that it would prevent chaos and keep law and order in the society. Secondly, they also legitimized the usurpation of power by powerful military man arguing that to reject him meant to create political unrest and a situation of civil war. Al-Marwardi (d.1058) was the political thinker who in his book *al-Ahkam al-Sultania* advises that a usurper should be recognized as legal ruler just to avoid bloodshed. *After settling the issue of kingship and usurper, the question was whether a ruler should remain under religious authority or should he use religion for his political motives?* To respond to this question and how king should behave, a genre of literature was produced known as the « *Mirror of Princes* ». Some of the important books are *Qabusnama* by Kaikaus (d.1082), *Siyasatnama* by Nizamulmuluk Tusi (d.1091) *Nasihat al-Muluk* by Ghazali (d.1111), and *Fatawa-i-Jahandari* by Ziauddin Barani. In this literature, kingship was recognized as a hereditary institution and the ruler was addressed as « *Zill-i-Ilahi* » (shadow of God). It was a Machiavellian step that freed king from all religious bindings and made him authoritative and powerful. Similarly, the « *Adab* » or the literature of the *Mirror of Princes* made the Muslim king free from the shariat and allowed him to rule absolutely. Their model was the Sassanid king who was all-powerful: in religion as well as worldly matters. However, attempt was made to control the authority of the ruler by asking him to follow a policy of justice like Anushirwan, the legendary king of Persia, who was famous for his benevolence and acts of justice. The method was to control absolute power by asking him to follow and adhere moral and ethical values in order to govern people.

In India, the Sultans of Delhi (1206-1526) adopted this model but the Mughal king Akbar shaped a different theory of kingship which suited the Indian environment. Abul Fazl (d.1602), the court historian and close friend and advisor to Akbar provided the philosophical basis for Mughal kingship by exalting the position and emphasizing the importance of royalty. Royalty, according to him, was the highest dignity in the eyes of God. It was light which emanated from God.

He calls it 'the Divine Light'. This light created paternal love for his subjects in the hear of the king and increased his trust in God.

Commenting on the Mughal concept of kingship, Vanina writes that apparently this theory does not look different than the Islamic or Hindu theories of kingship. However, deeper study reveals that it is not the same but quite different than the previous traditions. According to Abul Fazl king rules for the welfare of his subjects and to achieve this he has right to change ancient traditions and communal institutions. As royalty emanates from God, king does not need to follow the advice of ulema or religious scholars. He is authorized by the divine power to bring changes in social structure according to the need of time. Akbar did it. He banned the child marriages and marriage among close relatives. He also banned sati, though could not eliminate it altogether. In this respect, Akbar was the first Indian ruler who interfered in the affairs of community, caste, and family that were otherwise taboo for rulers to talk about or change them.

Akbar further extended his power when his *sadr al sadur* (Highest religious post at the Mughal court) ordered execution of a Brahman on the charges of blasphemy. *On this occasion Akbar asked Abul Fazl's father Shaikh Mubarak to guide him how to get rid of ulema?* The Shaikh suggested that Akbar should assume the authority of mujtahid with the approval of ulema. Akbar following his advice asked the ulema to sign a *mahzar* (so called decree of infallibility) delegating him authority to interpret religion. This combined in him religious as well as political powers and ulema lost their authority to challenge the royal decision.

Ziauddin Barani, a historian of the Saltanate period, explains his theory of kingship in his book *fatawa-i-Jahandari* that it is very difficult for a king to rule following the shariat. According to him there is difference between shariat and the rules and regulations of kingship. It is important for a king to keep and preserve his grandeur, pomp and glory. He should observe all court ceremonies such as prostration, and kissing of hand and foot by courtiers. He should live in palaces, keep his treasury full with all types of wealth and use it for his own personal needs.

All such acts are justified on the ground that a king without display of power and glamour is not respected by his subjects.

In this regard Ziauddin Barani quotes a dialogue between Alauddin Khilji (1296-1316) and Qazi Mughis in the *Tarikh-i-Firuzshahi*. When the king asked the qazi about his policies whether they were according to the shariat or not. The qazi replied in negative. On it, the response of the king was that he did not know anything about shariat. He did what he thought was good for his subjects.

Therefore, Muslim rulers in order to rule did not follow the shariat but formulated their own rules and regulations that were in favour of practical politics. As he was the shadow of God (*Zilli-i-Ilahi*) and deputy to God, those who rebelled against him were regarded as his personal enemies and were punished likely. They were not judged according to the shariat but on the basis of king's anger. Sometimes, they were hacked to pieces, and sometimes were trampled under the feet of an elephant. Alauddin Khilji not only punished the rebels but also in retaliation their family members including women and children were imprisoned, tortured and enslaved. According to Barani the custom to imprison women and children of rebels as a punishment was started by him that was continued later on by other rulers.

Under this model of kingship, muftis (jurists) and qazis (judges) became servants to the state and as such served the interest of rulers rather than implementation of the shariat. They issued fatwa whenever it was need by ruler to justify their acts. There are many such examples in the history. One interesting fatwa was regarding legitimizing Akbar's marriages. He married more than four wives and when it was pointed out that his extra marriages were illegal, he asked the ulema to find out some solution. The matter was discussed in the *Ibadatkhana* (house of worship) which was founded by him in 1575. The result was that one religious scholar interpreted that in the holy Quran there is verse which says to marry: 2, 3 and 4 which according to him was $2+3+4=9$. Another scholar's interpretation was $2+2+3+3+4+4=18$. However, Abdul Qadir Badauni, the historian, suggested that as in the Malki school of jurisprudence *muta'* (temporary

marriage) was legal and a qazi of Malki school could legalise his marriage after issuing such fatwa. Akbar was pleased on this suggestion. He immediately appointed a Malki qazi who forthwith issued the fatwa to legalise his extra marriages. Akbar, after getting the fatwa dismissed the qazi from the post. He did not want that the others should take advantage of it.

When Aurangzeb (1658-1707) executed Dara Shikoh and Murad, his two brothers, he made their execution religious and not political. Dara was condemned to death on the charges of atheism and Murad on the basis of qisas (revenge for homicide). Though everybody knew that he wanted to get rid of his brothers because they were claimants to the throne. He used religion to fulfil his political motives and ulema readily gave fatwa according to his liking.

In another incident when he was in the Deccan besieging the fort of Satara, four Muslims and nine Hindus were brought as prisoners of war. He asked the qazi for fatwa. He told the king that if the Hindus were to convert to Islam they should be released and the Muslims should be kept in prison, as punishment. Aurangzeb did not like this fatwa because he wanted to punish all of them and reprimanded the qazi that instead of Hanafi school of jurisprudence, he should find out other jurists for different opinion. The qazi understood that the king wanted severe punishment and issued another fatwa recommending that both the Muslims and the Hindus should be executed.

On one side Aurangzeb used religion for political purpose but when religious elements made attempts to use politics for their advantage he resisted it. For example when he was asked to expel the Hindus and the shias from his administration, his reply was that religion and politics were two separate things and they should not be mixed with each other. Similarly, when a qazi refused to recite the khutba in his name on the plea that his father, emperor Shahjahan, was alive, he dismissed him and appointed a qazi of his liking. Later on when some ulema opposed his invasion to the Deccan states as the Muslim kings ruled them. He did not bother their opinion; neither he bothered when a religious scholar reprimanded him in public that why he did not marry his daughters.

Against this model of kingship in which ruler became absolute, there were different movements to bring political authority under the shariat. One and the significant movement in this regard was of Imam Hanbal (d.855) who opposed the 'mu'tazilah' and Mamun's campaign of the 'creation of the Quran'. He underwent severe torture but persisted in his opinion. His followers were very strict in matter of shariat and during the Abbasid period they rioted in the different cities demanding the implementation of the rule of shariat. For example, they used to go to the bazaar of Baghdad and harass the shopkeepers for not observing religious rules. They destroyed wine shops and threatened people not to dance or sing. It was also common to attack opponents of their view. Those caliphs who did not care of their warning also became their victims. They publicly exhorted people to revolt against them.

Second important movement was of Ibn Taymmiya (d.1328). He belonged to the Hanbali school of jurisprudence and wanted that ulema should play effective role in political affairs. The main thrust of his movement was that instead of rulers, ulema should be given power to implement shariat. In India Mahdawi movement, which was started by Sayyid Mahdi Jaunpuri in the 15th century, wanted to purify Islam in India and establish an ideal Islamic society. In the 16th century, the movement became very popular in Gujarat but soon lost its popularity because of its extremism and finally was confined to its own da'ira or circle.

All such movements, which challenged the authority of Muslim rulers, were crushed with iron hand as no ruler tolerated any challenge against his power. Though such movements challenged the divine concept of kingship and his absolute power but at the same time they failed to win the support of people because of their fanatic attitude and ultimately collapsed without changing state structure.

In the second model of the state religion dominates politics and uses it for implementation of its practices. There were two types of religious dominations over politics:

- In one case, a ruler, in the interest of his rule and stability of his ruling dynasty, implement the shariat and allow ulema to play leading role in the state affairs.

- In the second category, ulema, after capturing political power, establish a religious state and force people to follow their religious agenda. Such religious states, wherever, they were founded in the West or in the East, basically believed that human being could be reformed only by coercion and control over his action. Therefore, to set up a purified society, strict and exemplary punishments were given on minor crimes. It was also believed that worldly rulers were corrupt and evil-minded, therefore, only religious scholars could rule with honesty and work for the welfare of people.

One of its examples is the city-state of Geneva that was established by the Christian reformer Calvin (d.1599). After acquiring political power, he was in a position to realize his religious ideals. First thing was done by him was an announcement that those who were not in favour of his religious ideas should leave the city. Those who stayed back faced his rigorous disciplinary action on different offences including excommunication from Christianity; exile from the city; imprisonment, and death penalty. On his order all hotels and guesthouses, which provided sexual facilities to the guests, were closed. Those traders and shopkeepers who were found involved in adulteration or weighing less were severely punished. Vulgar songs and playing cards were prohibited. Care was taken that Bible should be available on all-important places. Those who were found laughing during a sermon were reprimanded; it was obligatory for every citizen to thank God before eating. As a result of these strenuous laws, every individual and family in Geneva was completely under the control and supervision of spiritual police of Calvin. Punishments were severe and no consideration was made to exempt anybody. Once a child was beheaded on the crime that he struck his father. It is said that during the period of 6 years 150 heretics were burnt alive. The result was that the citizens of Geneva were soon fed up of this system and ended it after expelling Calvin from the city.

In the Islamic world we could see this model in Najad and Hijaz where in the 18th century a religious movement erupted and soon engulfed the whole region. Its founder Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (d.1792) launched the campaign to purify Islam from irreligious practices. Muhammad Ibn Saud, the founder of the Saudi ruling dynasty, was influenced by his teachings that made matrimonial alliances with his family. When one of the members of his dynasty, Saud (d.1814) defeated his rivals and established his rule he made the Wahabi religious ideas his state religion. As Wahabi believed in revivalism and purity of religion, they demolished tombs, took away religious relics which were kept there, and banned pilgrimage to shrines. On the one side, the Wahabis wanted to revive the ideal society of early Islam; on the other, they destroyed all historical monuments of the early Islamic history only because people were emotionally attached to them and regarded them as holy and sacred. They implemented strict rules and regulations for observation of religious practices as praying five times regularly and those who tried to avoid them were chased by the police (shurta) and forced them to go to mosques.

The Wahabi model inspired religious reformers in other Muslim countries and a number of movements emerged to capture power and reform society on the basis of their religious agenda. In India, the Jihad movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (d.1831) followed this pattern. To fulfil his mission, he migrated from North India to North Western Frontier in order to establish his Islamic state there. In 1827, he proclaimed himself as the caliph and Imam. He and his followers used all coercive methods to establish a pure and virtuous society in the frontier region. Mirza Hyrat Dehlavi, in his book *Hyat-i-Tayyaba* writes that Sayyid Sahib appointed many of his followers on important posts with the orders that they should force people to follow shariat. However, these officers misused their authority and sometimes forced young girls to marry them. It was also observed that some young holy warriors forcibly took away young ladies from bazaar and streets to mosque and married them without their consent. Those officers that were appointed to look after peasants also misused their power and arrogantly treated

the commonfolk. The result was that poor and simple villagers were fed up of their presence. The officers, in order to assert power, declare anybody as kafir (unbeliever). If he found somebody's beard larger than his standard, the lips of person were cut off as punishment. If somebody was found wearing tahmad (simple cloth to cover up lower body) below ankles, bones of his ankles were broken.

We have seen this model in Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban and in some altered shape in the post revolutionary Iran. It is also using all coercive methods to implement its own version of the shariat.

In the 19th century, the Islamic world passed through a crisis of colonialism that engulfed it and gradually established political domination nearly in all Muslim countries. The colonial state introduced a new structure of legal system that was quite different than the shariat. Colonial state separated religion from politics. Under these circumstances, two types of movements emerged in the Islamic countries: revivalist movements which resisted colonial state and its hegemony and wanted to implement the shariat. Mahdi Sudani's movement in Sudan and Sannusi movement in Libya worked in this direction. Then there were religious movements whose interest was to create a strong sense of religious identity among the Muslims without involving in politics. They were not in favour of cooperating with the colonial state. Deoband was its example. In its early period it remained aloof from politics and concentrated on religious teachings and spiritual training of the Muslim community. The Brelvis specially confined their activities to religious rituals.

However, the colonial state and its institutions had great impact on the social, cultural and economic life of colonized society. Introduction of technology changed the structure of society and behaviour of the people. New ideas of nationalism, socialism, Marxism, and the concept of free market challenged the old customs, traditions and values. Religion was not in a position to respond to these new challenges; therefore, it adopted a defensive policy and failed to take part in creative process of modern civilization. When it became stagnant and lost energy

and power to sustain opposition of modernity; it adopted an ideology of extremism and fundamentalism.

Another important feature of the colonial period was emergence of a European educated class whose model was Europe. They believed in separation of religion and politics. Subsequently religion became private matter of individual. Religious attitudes were further affected when there were political movements in the Islamic countries on the basis of nationalism. The character of nationalism was either territorial, linguistic or ethnic. It united people of other religions under the banner of nationalism. For example, in the Arab nationalism, the Muslims and Christians were united on linguistic basis in which Arabic language became source of unity and brotherhood.

After decolonisation, when nation state was established in the former colonies, their constitutions treated all citizens equal irrespective of their colour and creed. State institutions played neutral role in politics and treated religion as a private matter of individuals. However, in the case of Pakistan situation was quite different. Attempts were made to transform the new state as Islamic and bring politics and economy under its domination. Religious nationalism excluded people of other religions from its domain and equality of citizenship was affected when the society was divided as the Muslims and non-Muslims. This deprived religious minorities of their basic rights. Religion as a dominant ideology interfered in all aspects of life whether it was economy, education or science and technology.

Links 2.

1. M. Watt, *The Majesty that was Islam*, London, 1974, pp.108, 120.
2. Al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya* (Urdu translation), Karachi, 1965, p.66.
3. Abul Fazl, *A'in-i-Akbari*, Calcutta, 1867-1877, A'in,1, pp.2, 4.
4. Vanina. Eugenia, *Ideas and Society in India from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries*, OUP, Delhi, 1995, pp.59, 72.

5. Ziauddin Barani, *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, Mrs. A. Salim Khan (ed.), *Adara-i-Tahqiqat-i-Pakistan wa Danishgah Punjab*, Lahore, 1972, pp.67, 126, 166.
6. Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firuzshahi* (Urdu translation), Markazi Urdu Board, Lahore, 1969, p.234.
7. *Ibid.*, pp.378-79.
8. Mubarak Ali, *Ulema aur Siyasat* (Ulema and Politics), Fiction House, Lahore, 1994, p.63.
9. Mubarak Ali (ed.), *Aurangzeb Alamgir*, Fiction House, Lahore, 2000, pp.11-2.
10. Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge, 1988, p.167.
11. J.A. Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe from the Renaissance to Present*, Utah, 1988, New York, 1978, Pantheon Islam University Press, p.119.
12. Mirza Hyrat Dehlavi, *Hayat-i-Tayyaba*, Islami Academy, Urdu Bazar, Lahore, 1976, p.280.
13. Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern*, University of Utah Press, 1088, p.7.

The conclusions

Erin Wilson reconsiders the political dimensions of religious activity in light of what some are describing as our post-secular society, arguing that limited understandings of both religion and politics restrict the capacity of scholars and faith-based actors alike to perceive the significant influence that religious actions and rituals can have in the political realm. Wilson outlines the dimensions of a post-secular society, drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas, alongside recent critiques of his work by IR scholars such as Fred Dallmayr, Adrian Pabst, Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito. She then investigates existing approaches to understanding religion and politics within IR, putting forward an alternative framework for analysing the religious and the political in a post-secular society, before turning to an exploration of the activities of faith-based actors in the asylum sector in Australia. Wilson highlights the ways in which predominantly religious activities, such as prayer, charity and hospitality to the stranger, can have significant political implications, both in the immediate and in the long term. Scholars, policymakers and faith-based actors themselves need to develop more nuanced understandings of how religious actions take on political meaning, intended and unintended, in order to appreciate the growing influence of faith-based actors in post-secular societies.

Matthew J.P. Tan questions why the boundary between the religious and the political is a continuously vexing dilemma for Christians who want to contribute to public life and those who want to engage with public life in a manner that is consistent with their spiritual lives. Tan seeks to suggest an alternative and proposes that the spiritual life, enacted in the practice of prayer, is not incidental to public life, but actually constitutes a unique politics. Prayer bears within its practices a political theory that, on the one hand, provides areas of interface with secular political theory and practice, whilst at the same time providing a critique of many presumptions of the political status quo. First, Tan looks generally at the relationship between practice and theory, before analysing how the embodied

nature of prayer implicates the contours of a new public body. This new body in turn suggests new contours of what it means to be a political subject, new terms of citizenship and, flowing from that, a new kind of political *modus vivendi*, exemplified by new attitudes to the necessity of survival in politics and new attitudes to political risk.

David Ingram examines the way in which the spread of 'postmodern' global capitalism has provoked a religious backlash. Ingram argues that although it pushes against an excessively materialistic form of secularism, this backlash also targets an idealistic variant: multiculturalism. However, arguably, this apparent hostility to secularism, pluralism and democratic compromise is belied by a further idealistic component within the Islamic/Christian imaginary: a transcendent commitment to social justice. Political opposition to postmodern capitalism's stratifying dynamic, which contradicts the holy command to combat material oppression on this earth, strongly encourages religious fundamentalists to pursue a secular agenda whose broad scope and success requires a modest acceptance of self-limiting compromise and political argumentation.

Addressing both Catholic and Islamic strands of religious politics along with their ambivalent relationship to secular democracy, Ingram demonstrates that religious politics and secular democracy shape each other, as both in turn respond to deeper socio-economic changes in their environment. Ingram distinguishes between different types of religious politics but also between varieties of secular democracy. Ingram argues that sometimes religious commitment can act as a stimulus to creating and preserving secular democracy.

Claudia Baumgart-Ochse asserts that in academic literature as well as in the liberal, left-wing political discourse on Israeli democracy one finds a recurring theme: the State of Israel, so the lamentation goes, has been hijacked by Jewish religious extremists and therefore runs the risk of inflicting serious damage on its liberal democratic political system. In this view, the national-religious settler movement has systematically penetrated the state apparatus in order to pursue its parochial interests and reformulate Israel's otherwise secular national identity and

politics. However this argument ignores the complex interrelationship between them. It is argued that the mobilising force of Israel's basically secular national ideology – Zionism – has from its inception depended on a deep ambivalence towards the Jewish religion. Secular Zionism and politicised Jewish religion are part and parcel of a system of exclusion via grouping, which constitutes the boundaries of national identity. Although considerable tensions exist between the secular and religious camps in Israeli society, the state's political elite has so far managed to utilise these diverging ideologies and interests for maintaining the overall *raison d'état* as well as for the realisation of specific policies with regard to the conflict.

Samantha May focuses on Islamic understandings of territorial sovereignty, specifically the case of Palestine. The dominance of national understandings of territory has led to many theorists assuming that this is the only form of political geography. An examination of the conception of *waqf*lands (Islamic endowments) reveals a far more nuanced understanding. Using the primary example of the Palestinian movement Hamas, this article proposes that Hamas' understanding of *waqf*as both God's land in perpetuity and the territorial justification for an independent Palestinian state challenges Western assumptions of national territory and the monopoly of legitimate violence. Drawing on historical and Quranic conceptions of territory alters the Westphalian understanding of national territory as a delineated geography, but opens new avenues for understanding transIslamic dimensions to Islamic nationalisms.

Faiz Sheikh examines the ways in which the EU has successfully developed a legal identity that is externally affirmed by the international system, while the Muslim community, *umma*, struggles to do so with any great efficacy. In comparing the identity of the EU and the *umma*, the difficulties faced in virtue of their transnational character are raised. However, the *umma* identity is shown to face more problems than its erstwhile EU counterpart due to the overtly religious nature of the *umma*. Sheikh's article establishes constructivism as capable of explaining the creation of norms and identity in the international system,

accounting for the experience of the EU's identity. The application of constructivism to the *umma* is shown to be more problematic due to the secular bias in IR⁸⁶ and, perhaps more importantly, the Islamic resurgence being insufficiently concerned with the constitutive elements within it.

John A. Rees outlines that the study of IR has taken a 'post-secular turn' in recent years, which has led to a renewed focus on the political agency of 'religion'. This article employs the language and functions of grammar to explain the significance of post-secularism, forming three arguments. First, the article suggests that the challenge of studying religion and IR has shifted from one of morphology (i.e. the forms that religion takes) to one of syntax (i.e. the function of religious actors and interests). This marks an important shift in the research agenda from concerns with 'what religion is' to 'what religion does' in the international sphere. Second, Rees argues that a post-secular syntax allows religion to be understood through the full array of 'cases' in world politics. Third, the article proposes that whereas secularism attributes religion primarily with an accusative quality (i.e. suffering the action of other more dominant actors and interests), a post-secular approach broadens the research agenda by allowing religion to be situated throughout the discourse of power. Thus, post-secularism attributes religion with a structural quality because it can be found to influence the full array of actor behaviour in the political sphere. Understood in this way, post-secularism challenges scholars to produce a new understanding of how religion is 'read' in the construction of international affairs.

The articles in this special issue all provide unique insights on important topics that are being increasingly questioned amid the broader project of rethinking religion and its place in IR theory and practice. The power and role of the state, the neutrality of concepts such as 'reason' and 'rationality', conceptual and political boundaries and the utility of binaries, such as public/private, for understanding the relationship between the religious and the political are all questioned throughout the articles in this issue, providing further enrichment for the ongoing debate around the secularist bias and religion's place in global politics.

After analyzing the impact of different models, we can reach to the conclusion that what comes out when religion and politics integrate with each other; and what happens when politics dominates religion or religion subordinates politics. In case of this integration, an absolutist and dictatorial system emerges which saps all creative energies of society and reduces it to passivity. In case of conflict, both religion and politics use people and their resources in acquiring power and deprive them of social and cultural activities. For example, in today's Saudi Arabia, there is wealth and vast material resources that provide all sorts of comfort and luxury but there is no culture. Culturally, it is the most backward and barren society. It neither produced any musician, nor artist, writer, and filmmaker. It is a society of consumers and not of contributors.

However, whenever, religion relegates under the political, social, or economic pressure, society contributes in philosophy, art and literature, and music. In history such were the periods of the Abbasid rule whose caliph patronized men of letters and scientists. Akbar's period in the Mughal rule is significant because during this period new ideas were allowed to flourish. Society becomes free when the hold of religion is weak; it becomes barren when religion dominates society and adopts hostility to all new changes. It reverts back society to old traditions and reduces the role of modernity.

Separation of religion from politics does not make it weak or vulnerable. Real strength of religion lies in the belief in its truthfulness and not in patronization and protection of state. History is evident that whenever, politics is called to help religion, it uses it for its interest and makes effort to subordinate it which subsequently weakens religion and its beliefs. Moreover, whenever, religion tries to interfere in economy or politics and cannot keep pace with changes, it becomes butt of criticism. It is evident that in the modern period there is rapid development in social and natural sciences and religion is not in a position to accommodate all these changes or to interpret them in religious terms, therefore, the best way is to separate it from politics, economy, and science and technology.