

The “Sea Factor” in Regional Cooperation: The Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Sergiy Kivalov*

**Doctor of Law, Professor, President of National University Odessa Law Academy (23, Fontanska Doroga, Odessa, Ukraine)
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4651-1805>*

ABSTRACT

The “sea factor” has a crucial influence on coastal states’ domestic and foreign policies, and may create additional incentives for regional cooperation and integration. The Russo-Ukrainian War, the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, has become a stress test for many regional transport and infrastructure projects. Moreover, this armed conflict has had different effects in different cases. For the Three Seas Initiative, the Russo-Ukrainian war became an additional incentive to strengthen cooperation. It gave the initiative new meaning and even stimulated its expansion through the decision to grant partner status to Ukraine. At the same time, this conflict had negative consequences for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The war also led to the emergence of another area of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

CITATION

Kivalov, S. (2023). The “Sea Factor” in Regional Cooperation: The Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War. *Lex Portus*, 9(2), 19–27.
<https://doi.org/10.26886/2524-101X.9.2.2023.2>

KEYWORDS

Three Seas Initiative, BRI, Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ukraine, Russia, war, armed conflict.



The journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License

Introduction

Geopolitical instability and a series of open and hybrid conflicts have significantly impacted the development of the modern maritime industry over the last decade. Within the framework of these conflicts, the coastal factor is of particular importance, determining the political decisions and positioning of states as they change and adapt to the new reality. Different coastal rights claims and militarized “walls” in the sea become significant obstacles to the freedom of navigation, leading to new divisions in maritime space (Wirth, 2023). However, these issues go far beyond freedom of navigation and impact all fields of modern ocean governance. While nation-states remain the primary actors for global ocean governance, maritime disputes inevitably harm their willingness to cooperate (Song et al., 2022).

Sea and ocean coasts are historically the basis of states’ economic, political, and military power. States’ maritime policy is shaped over decades and centuries by a complex interplay of interests and challenges, threats, regional geographic and climatic features, proximity to or participation in conflicts, and the consequences of artificial and environmental disasters. This makes maritime history complex and comprehensive, covering broad policy topics and objectives (Bach & Hansen, 2023). Maritime policies (‘maritime’ here referring to both ports and shipping) usually result from a multitude of public policy, societal, economic, defense, and other interests (Baird, 2005, p. 385). Even UNCLOS’82 (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the signing of which at first glance settled the main issues of coastal rights, requires the conclusion of additional multilateral and bilateral agreements to fully realize its potential. In addition, deficiencies such as vagueness and different interpretations make consultation on UNCLOS necessary (Song et al., 2022). This encourages states to develop and refine specific legal policies covering substantive topics, negotiation approaches, and dispute settlement concerning coastal rights (Fife, 2023). Thus, the maritime policy of the state

operates in both internal and external directions, creating a specific regulatory environment within the framework of the interaction of global, regional, and national rules. Moreover, one of the characteristics of modern maritime policy, both at the level of international organizations and at the level of national states, is a balance between regulatory (based on laws and binding regulations), economic (provision of pecuniary incentives and disincentives) and soft (voluntary measures and information provision) instruments (Bach & Hansen, 2023).

National maritime policy intentions and directions are fixed in policy and the normative documents of strategic planning. They become “road maps” for the policy’s implementation and determine the ways in which legislation and the mechanisms for its implementation develop. The elements of maritime policy (public relations, ideology, legislation, and administrative entities) are closely related and interact at different levels. At the same time, they also retain their autonomy. Some have powers of authority, and the forms and methods (instruments) of their function are clearly defined. Today, as before, merchant fleets and navies are the defining components of the global trade and security system, and the “sea factor” dominates many others in determining the national policy of states.

Methodology

The article reviews some aspects of the influence of modern conflicts on the status of coastal waters and, consequently, on the formation of coastal states’ internal and foreign maritime policies. To illustrate, I use the influence of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) and on Chinese political ambitions regarding the Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI). I argue that such conflicts may have both stimulating and slowing effects on the regional cooperation of coastal states as they develop supply chains and infrastructure.

1. European Coastal States Integration in the Shadow of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Coastal states often have similar aspirations for and interests in exploring and using their water and land territories. Through closer integration, they can achieve high levels of cooperation and development, share experience, and create mutually beneficial partnerships in their geographic region and beyond. The Central and Eastern European project of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) is one example in which the “sea factor” becomes a driving force for closer regional integration.

Although some authors argue that TSI is limited to cooperation in building the infrastructure of 12 countries located on the eastern periphery of the EU (Zięba, 2023), from the time of its inception in 2016 the TSI agenda has been two-fold. While from the functionalist perspective the initiative complements the EU agenda as it furthers the goals of better transportation connectivity, infrastructure development, and energy security, normative philosophy embraces alternative security motivations, such as Polish aspirations to be the leading power in this part of Europe or American geopolitical and economic interests (Grgić, 2023). Or as Bartoszewicz (2023) puts it, Intermarium is an attempt to break away from everything that prevents the region ‘between Berlin and Moscow’ from being a subject, not an object, of political affairs, and shows how Central and Eastern Europe fit into the post-liberal international order. Thus, the integration dynamics within TSI are stymied by certain disputes between the “old” and “new” Europe, between the EU and the United States.

In its early years, TSI was mainly focused on infrastructure projects, where the three seas (Black, Baltic, and Adriatic) acted as a consolidating factor for coastal states in the search for new transport, logistics, and energy solutions. However, over time TSI also came to incorporate certain global goals, like the transition to a “green” and “digital” economy (Bilenets et al., 2022; Brodny & Tutak, 2023). As a result, in 2022, more than 90 projects were merged under the

auspices of TSI. Of these, 38 % are in Energy sphere, 14 % are Digital, and 48 % are in Transport. Hungary and Croatia have the most significant number of projects (Status Report of 2022).

However, it is safe to say that the Russo-Ukrainian war has, in many ways, activated the second component of TSI, forcing the examination of infrastructure projects from the perspective of international security and geopolitical confrontation. In particular, the regional impact of the biggest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War has made TSI countries overcome the inertia of their traditional prioritization of east-west corridors and shift focus to the development a more omnidirectional web of cross-border links (The Economist, 2023). The Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki emphasized that TSI has been made a necessity by Russia's war on Ukraine and could play a key role in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction (TheFirstNews, 2023). Since 2022, and unlike previous TSI summits at which the topic was barely mentioned, cooperation with Ukraine has dominated almost all the discussions and questions (Tsonev, 2022). TSI countries' seaports have become essential for Ukrainian imports and exports as a result of the Russian naval blockade of Ukrainian seaports. For example, since 2022, Romanian and Polish seaports have shared the majority of Ukrainian transit requirements for agricultural goods – 80 % and 10 % respectively (Melnik, 2023). Thus, the war has contributed to the revision of infrastructure policies within the TSI and stimulated the expansion of this initiative. This expansion took place both spatially – by granting Ukraine the status of a partner – and in the element of strategic planning, which now covers the development of Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

As the war continues, transport links within the region continue to grow and influence the situation inside Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine is already participating in several TSI projects: Via Carpatia (Stur, 2017); Viking Train (Onze, n.d.; Alliance Logistics, n.d.); and the transit of natural gas from Swinoujście (through Poland) to Ukraine (Korsunskyi, 2019) as part of the Baltic Pipe project, for which it has signed a Polish-Ukrainian-American memorandum of cooperation and plans to build a gas interconnector from Germanovichi (Poland) – Bilche-Volitsya (Ukraine) with a capacity of 5 billion m³ of gas annually (Kurnosov, 2022). In addition, Ukraine takes part in the EU Macro-Regional Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) (Macro-Regional Strategies, n.d.). In general, as a result of participation in TSI, one should expect a revival in the railway and water traffic, better connecting Ukrainian and Moldovan railway networks with the EU (European Commission. Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, 2022) and improving the entire Danube port cluster of Ukraine with the renewal of the stevedoring infrastructure and the deepening of the approach channels to be take ships of deeper draft.

The Maritime Doctrine of Ukraine for the period up to 2035 mentions some further aspects of regional cooperation:

- active participation in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), and the European Union for Improving Environmental Monitoring of the Black Sea (EMBLAS)
- Ukraine's implementation of environmental control at sea under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive
- creation of a European-style vessel traffic system in Ukraine and its integration into SafeSeaNet
- development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)
- implementation of the project "Three Seas – One Hundred Roads," with the organization of multimodal transportation between the regions of the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas.

However, these goals are scattered throughout different sections of the Doctrine. Furthermore, these goals focus only on coastal regions and do not consider the transit

potential of cooperation with the whole state's transport sector. Given the unclear futures of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and the reorientation of Ukrainian import and export transport routes via the EU seaports, this may be an issue.

Another example of regional cooperation between coastal states affected by the Russo-Ukrainian war is the Black Sea Grain Initiative (The Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, 2022) agreed between Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, which opened the possibility for sea transportation of grain, related foodstuffs, and fertilizers from the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Pivdenniy, and Chornomorsk. The term "cooperation" here applies to the relations between Ukraine and Turkey, where the latter managed to mitigate the Russian hybrid strategy and treatment of weak and strong adversaries to make international arrangements in this conflict. While Russia repeatedly conducts missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian port cities involved in the Grain Initiative, it does not interfere with shipping corridors, where Turkey manages security issues (Kormych & Malyarenko, 2022).

The "sea factor" in the Black Sea Grain Initiative has several components. First, it creates opportunities for the functioning of Ukrainian seaports and creates security zones for the passage of ships. Second, the guarantor and primary facilitator of the initiative is Turkey, which occupies a key geopolitical position for any transit to and from the Black Sea. Third, the specific maritime agreement provides a formal legal framework for arrangements within the Initiative. The Initiative is based on "alternative security agreements" aimed at implementing the requirements for maritime safety in Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Because the agreement is connected to and compatible with the legal framework familiar to the shipping industry, the parties provided additional comfort to the market, increasing the credibility of the underlying commitments (Soldatenko, 2023).

The practical realization of the Black Sea Grain Initiative seems to be double-sided. On the one hand, there are many discussions about including more Ukrainian ports in the Initiative (Ukrinform, 2023; European Pravda, 2023) and expanding goods' nomenclature (Kolishnichenko, 2022). On the other hand, during the entire period of this Initiative, there was a mutual exchange of accusations of slowing down procedures (Yakymuk, 2023), violating accepted obligations (Bassarova, 2023; Hordiichuk, 2023), etc. Nevertheless, the supply chain established under the Initiative appears to be the most cost-effective option available, showing a 40% increase due to smaller ships being used, while the other available chains show almost two-and-a-half times the total cost of the pre-conflict supply chains (Fernandes et al., 2023).

2. Declining interest in BRI and China's geopolitical ambitions

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global cooperation platform that demonstrates China's vision and provides solutions to the reform of the global governance system and its associated, multifaceted challenges (Hellenic Shipping News, 2023). Investments in transport infrastructure over most of the world have exercised "soft power" that gradually ensured the presence of the Chinese in the administration of large logistics centers and their introduction into sectors of the economy that are strategic for many countries. Moreover, the BRI's integration of the ideas of the Maritime Silk Road and Overland Silk Road reveals several facets of the post-Cultural Revolution People's Republic of China (PRC), including intellectual discourse and negotiation, the proliferation of national pride, heritage- and tradition-making, and the integration of foreign-policy objectives, as well as domestic and international frictions and tensions—all of which are deeply ingrained in the term 'Silk Road' and its history (Sen, 2023). Thus, the significance of implementing BRI has always gone far beyond the functioning of

supply chains. However, at the same time, the transport links within the BRI are also subject to the influence of many factors that, at first glance, are not directly related.

For example, some authors emphasize the interplay between the BRI and maritime militarized interstate disputes in Southeast Asia (Wu, 2023) or China-US trade conflicts causing the reshoring of foreign companies' production lines from China (Lee & Song, 2023).

The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant damage to the BRI. It impacted global supply chains, international logistics, and transportation, halting or slowing BRI projects. At the same time, China has faced challenges caused by its economic, socio-demographic, and global political structural changes (Lee & Song, 2023).

In addition, corruption risks, debt traps, and increasing dependence on China have recently significantly increased Chinese investment wariness (Serafimov et al., 2021; Görömbölyi, 2022). The main element of the BRI is the construction and provision of infrastructure in the participating countries. The interdependency lies in the aspects of rising debts and repayment issues among the participants. In some cases, China proposed paying off the debts by leasing or taking over certain territories in the debtor countries (Lukeš, 2023).

Finally, an enormous constraint on the development of the BRI has resulted from Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and China's position towards this conflict. First, the war disrupted economic relations between China and Ukraine, which accounted for \$19.3 billion in 2021. Second, the conflict postponed Ukrainian participation in BRI, including the development of construction contracts in the transportation and energy sectors worth \$3 billion (Bo, 2023). In addition, the Russo-Ukrainian war impacted all BRI pillars, particularly interconnectivity and global supply chains (Mendez et al., 2022). Regarding interconnectivity, the EU member states continue to withhold cooperation with Russia and some other countries in Moscow's geopolitical orbit along the New Eurasian Land Bridge. In terms of supply chains, the imposition of new economic sanctions and other restrictions on Russia had a net effect on the flow of critical components along the BRI.

Against this background, the "sea factor" increases in significance because, unlike the land elements of BRI, the Maritime Silk Road seems much more resistant to damaging factors. For example, the maritime component makes it possible to maintain the Chinese presence in European infrastructure projects. That said, it is worth recognizing that this presence has been much reduced, without significant stakes in investment recipients, although it continues to maintain the ability to influence the trajectories of such projects.

The German government has decided to limit the minority stake held by Chinese company COSCO Shipping Ports Limited (CSPL) in Container Terminal Tollerort (CTT), Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA), to an amount of less than 25%. COSCO originally wanted to take over 35% of Container Terminal Tollerort GmbH's operating company. However, a fierce political dispute erupted in the German government over whether to allow Chinese participation. In October 2022, the cabinet decided on a so-called partial prohibition, which only allowed COSCO to acquire a stake of less than 25 percent. Any further acquisition above this threshold was prohibited (Marketscreener, 2023). This is much smaller than previous Chinese port projects, a prime example of which is the port of Piraeus, where COSCO owns a controlling stake and administers its operations (Schälter, 2022; Li, 2022). COSCO already has shares in 15 different European ports in Greece, Malta, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany (Maritime Gateway, 2022).

The maritime segment of BRI is not limited to Europe. It is represented in port projects around the world and it covers the Chinese maritime presence in high latitudes, with ambitious plans to develop Arctic transport routes as the shortest way to ensure the supply chains of

Chinese goods to Europe. This intention of the BRI suggests a revitalization of the Chinese presence in shipping along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Chinese interest in the commercial exploitation of Arctic shipping was also reflected in their effort to send a ship through the NSR on an experimental voyage in 2013. The journey of the combined bulk carrier/container ship Yong Shen in August/September 2013 drew headlines worldwide (Moe & Stokke, 2019). At the same time, the Russian Federation tightened the rules for using this route in 2022 (Parliament of Russian Federation, 2022), which forced adjustments to this project. The Chinese shipping company COSCO, a regular visitor of the route over the previous decade, did not dispatch vessels into the Arctic in 2022 (Humpert, 2023).

Another link in the BRI has undergone changes since 2021. As Sam Chambers (2021) notes, the strategic location of Afghanistan, where the Taliban came to power in the second half of 2021, may make it an important link in the BRI. Earlier, it was noted that BRI's success in the "central zone" of its economic belt depends on the situation in Afghanistan (Pimenova, 2020, p. 4). The lack of access to the sea for this state poses the problem of access to the system of international water communications in acute form. In August 2021, it was suggested that despite Afghanistan working with India and Iran to develop the Chabahar Port in Iran's east, the return of the Taliban to power meant that Afghan exports and imports are now more likely to go through Karachi (Chambers, 2021). At the same time, in September 2021, the Taliban announced their support for and continued cooperation with China (Troickaja, 2021), considering it their leading international partner (Oilgas, 2021). This did not occur by chance. The PRC pays close attention to the development of the port of Gwadar, which is a key BRI element in the region. In 2013, it was transferred to the control of the Chinese company Overseas Ports Holding Limited. However, the port cannot function independently: infrastructure is needed to increase access to the facility, and there is essentially no regular movement of cargo ships there (Hatson, 2021).

Conclusions

The "sea factor," even in the context of armed conflicts, determines many integration processes among coastal states; makes it possible to develop and search for innovative solutions in the fields of maritime management, transport, and energy; and ensures the safety of navigation, all while following the principles of sustainable development. Moreover, maritime infrastructure, transport projects, and regional cooperation among coastal states show noteworthy resilience to hybrid and conventional threats, which are the negative consequences of regional conflicts. At the same time, such conflicts significantly impact the maritime policies of coastal states, although not only negatively. As we have seen, conflicts can increase the importance of various regional initiatives, contribute to their transformation, and direct the search for ways to increase efficiency.

REFERENCES

- Alliance Logistics. (n.d.). "Viking Train" Project. <https://alliance.net/viking-train-project/>
- Bach, H., & Hansen, T. (2023). Flickering guiding light from the International Maritime Organisation's policy mix. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, 47, 100720. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2023.100720>
- Baird, A. J. (2005) Maritime policy in Scotland. *Maritime Policy & Management*, 32(4), 383–401. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03088830500300404>
- Bartoszewicz, M. G. (2023). Intermarium: A Bid for Polycentric Europe. *Geopolitics*, 28(2), 795–819. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1973439>
- Bassarova, O. (2023, April 25). In Russia announced the threat of failure of the grain deal with Ukraine. *Kursiv*. <https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-04-25/lsbs-atakazernosdelka/> [in Russian].

- Bilenets, D., Ulianova, H., & Vozniakovska, K. (2022). Three Seas Initiative and Ukrainian Seaports' Prospects amid Russian Aggression. *Lex Portus*, 8(5), 48–70. <https://doi.org/10.26886/2524-101X.8.5.2022.2>
- Bo, H. (2023). Implications of the Ukraine war for China: can China survive secondary sanctions? *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies*, 21(2), 311–322. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14765284.2022.2136933>
- Brodny, J., & Tutak, M. (2023). Assessing the level of digital maturity in the Three Seas Initiative countries. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 190, 122462. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2023.122462>
- Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2018, December 18). *Resolution on Amendments to the Maritime Doctrine of Ukraine for the Period until 2035*. (No. 1108). Official Bulletin of Ukraine, 2019, 2, 85, 53. [in Ukrainian].
- Chambers, S. (2021, August 16). How the Taliban takeover in landlocked Afghanistan will change shipping patterns. *Splash247*. https://splash247.com/how-the-taliban-takeover-in-landlocked-afghanistan-will-change-shipping-patterns/?fbclid=IwAR1I_PG8vahX-sOqaY3CgWXjDxcWufdv2jV5pXz877oPI36s6c45GbKqISl
- European Commission. Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. (2022, October 21). *Rail: Commission initiates feasibility study to better connect Ukrainian and Moldovan railway networks with EU*. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/commission-initiates-feasibility-study-better-connect-ukrainian-and-moldovan-railway-networks-eu-2022-10-21_en
- European Pravda. (2023, February 28). *Ukrainian business asks the UN and Turkey to facilitate the work of the "grain agreement"*. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/02/28/7157105/> [in Ukrainian].
- Fernandes, G., Teixeira, P., & Santos, T. A. (2023). The impact of the Ukraine conflict in internal and external grain transport costs. *Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, 19, 100803. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2023.100803>
- Fife, R. E. (2023). Contributions of LOSC Jurisprudence to Reaching and Justifying a Negotiated Outcome – and Contributions of Negotiated Settlements to the Law of the Sea. *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 38(2), 363–377. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-bja10130>
- Görömbölyi, D. (2022). China, Its Belt and Road Initiative, and Its Uniquely Matching Latin American Host Environment. *Lex Portus*, 8(5), 71–94. <https://doi.org/10.26886/2524-101X.8.5.2022.3>
- Grgić, G. (2023). The Changing Dynamics of Regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of the Three Seas Initiative. *Geopolitics*, 28(1), 216–238. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1881489>
- Hatson, N. (2021, May 17). Central Asia Faces Obstacles on its Way to the Sea. *Eurasianet*. <https://russian.eurasianet.org/центральная-азия-встречает-препятствия-на-пути-к-морю> [in Russian].
- Hellenic Shipping News. (2023, January 16). *As BRI enters 10th year of development, China-Europe freight train set to see 'explosive growth' in 2023*. <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/as-bri-enters-10th-year-of-development-china-europe-freight-train-set-to-see-explosive-growth-in-2023/>
- Hordiichuk, D. (2023, February 16). Shortened working day and continuous "tea parties": How Russia is trying to derail the grain agreement. *Economic Pravda*. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2023/02/16/697096/> [in Ukrainian].
- Humpert, M. (2023, January 18). Russia's Northern Sea Route Sees More Traffic Despite War and Sanctions. *High North News*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russias-northern-sea-route-sees-more-traffic-despite-war-and-sanctions>
- Kolisnichenko, V. (2022, August 5). The Ministry of Economy calls to extend the grain agreement to the export of iron ore. *Gmk.center*. <https://gmk.center/en/news/the-ministry-of-economy-calls-to-extend-the-grain-agreement-to-the-export-of-iron-ore/>
- Kormych, B., & Malyarenko, T. (2022). From gray zone to conventional warfare: the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the Black Sea. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2122278>
- Korsunskyi, S. (2019, September 3). About Polish Gas, Energy Security and Gazprom's Signal. *Hromadske*. <http://surl.li/gzowo> [in Ukrainian].
- Kurnosov, A. (2022, September 27). The End of Russia's Gas Dictate: What the Opening of the Baltic Pipe Gas Pipeline will do for the EU and Ukraine? *Radio Svoboda*. <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/baltic-pipe-novyy-hazoprovod-bez-rosiyi/32054601.html> [in Ukrainian].
- Lee, P.T.-W., & Song, Z. (2023). Exploring a new development direction of the Belt and Road Initiative in the transitional period towards the post-COVID-19 era. *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review*, 172, 103082. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2023.103082>

- Li, M. (2022, October 27). Cosco stake in Hamburg's CTT stirs unease over Chinese influence in ports. *The Loadstar*. <https://theloadstar.com/cosco-stake-in-hamburgs-ctt-stirs-unease-over-chinese-influence-in-ports/>
- Lukeš, F. (2023, April 24). China's Belt and Road Initiative: Transforming the Middle East at a Cost to the U.S. *CBAP*. <https://cbap.cz/archiv/5295>
- Macro-Regional Strategies*. (n.d.). https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/cooperation/macro-regional-strategies/danube_en
- Maritime Gateway. (2022, December 6). *COSCO's Rising European Footprint*. <https://www.maritimegateway.com/coscos-rising-european-footprint/>
- Marketscreener. (2023, May 10). *Cosco allowed to take a stake in Hamburg's HHLA terminal*. <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/HAMBURGER-HAFEN-UND-LOGIS-698551/news/Cosco-allowed-to-take-a-stake-in-Hamburg-s-HHLA-terminal-43806985/>
- Melnik, S. (2023, April 20). Minister: Romania will not close the transit of Ukrainian grain. 80 % of overland exports take this route. *Ekonomik Pravda*. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2023/04/20/699292/>
- Mendez, A., Forcadell, F. J., & Horiachko, K. (2022). Russia–Ukraine crisis: China's Belt Road Initiative at the crossroads. *Asian Business and Management*, 21, 488–496. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41291-022-00195-1>
- Moe, A., & Stokke, O. S. (2019). Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance. *Arctic Review on Law and Politics*, 10, 24–52. <https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v10.1374>
- Oilgas. (2021, September 4). *Afghanistan supports China's Belt and Road program, which contributes to the development of the region, – Taliban spokesman*. <https://oilgas.gov.tm/en/posts/news/2844/afganistan-podderzhivaet-kitayskuyu-programmu-odin-poyas-odin-put-kotoraya-sposobstvuet-razvitiyu-regiona-predstavitel-taliban>
- Onze. (n.d.). *Container Train Viking*. <https://www.onze.lt/en/container-train-viking/>
- Parliament of Russian Federation. (2022, December 5). *Federal Law on Amendments to the Federal Law on Inland Sea Waters, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation*. (No. 510-FZ). Electronic fund of legal and regulatory technical documents. <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1300131671> [in Russian].
- Pimenova, A. (2020). "One Belt – One Road" as China's global economic project. *Koncept*, 5. <https://doi.org/10.24411/2304-120X-2020-13011> [in Russian].
- Schälter, V. (2022, Oktober 25). Cosco in Piräus – eine Erfolgsgeschichte? *Tagesschau*. <https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/weltwirtschaft/piraeus-cosco-hafen-101.html> [in Deutsch].
- Sen, T. (2023). Inventing the 'Maritime Silk Road'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 1–46. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X22000348>
- Serafimov, V., Stets, O., & Shkolyk, A. (2021). Seaports in the BRI: Challenges, Solutions and Emerging Regulations. *Lex Portus*, 7(5), 14–41. <https://doi.org/10.26886/2524-101X.7.5.2021.2>
- SOLAS. *Consolidated Edition*, 2014. <http://wrlending.com/english/data/upload/file/201608/7cb21026e7c7ca707e848808fb27f30c.pdf>
- Soldatenko, M. (2023, April 21). The Black Sea Grain Deal: Fragile Cooperation Between Ukraine and Russia. *Lawfare*. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/black-sea-grain-deal-fragile-cooperation-between-ukraine-and-russia>
- Song, R., Wu, L., Geraci, M., & Zhong, H. (2022). Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance 2021: Symposium Report. *Marine Policy*, 146, 105302. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105302>
- Status Report of 2022*. <https://projects.3seas.eu/report>
- Stur, B. (2017, October 24). Poland, Ukraine to build Via Carpathia. *Neweurope*. <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/poland-ukraine-build-via-carpathia/>
- The Economist. (2023, January 19). *The Ukraine war is forcing eastern Europe to build more links*. <https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/01/19/the-ukraine-war-is-forcing-eastern-europe-to-build-more-links>
- The First News. (2023, May 17). *Three Seas project necessary owing to Russia-Ukraine war says PM*. <https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/three-seas-project-necessary-owing-to-russia-ukraine-war-says-pm-38501>
- The Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports, 2022*. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf
- Troickaja, Ju. (2021, September 3). "Belt and Road": Taliban hope to continue cooperation with China. *Sputniknews*. <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20210903/odin-poyas-i-odin-put-taliby-nadeyutsya-na-prodoljenie-sotrudnichestva-s-kitaem-20351585.html> [in Russian].

- Tsonev, B. (2022, October 30). The Three Seas Initiative aims to expand with Ukraine. *London Politica*. <https://londonpolitica.com/ukraine-watch-blog-list/the-three-seas-initiative-aims-to-expand-with-ukraine>
- Ukrinform. (2023, April 21). *The ambassador of Ukraine to Turkey said what depends on the expansion of the "grain agreement" to the ports of Mykolaiv*. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/3698923-posol-ukraini-utureccini-skazav-vid-cogo-zalezit-rozsirennja-zernovoi-ugodi-na-porti-mikolaeva.html> [in Ukrainian].
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982*. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
- Wirth, C. (2023). Solidifying sovereign power in liquid space: The making and breaking of 'island chains' and 'walls' at sea. *Political Geography*, 103, 102889. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102889>
- Wu, C. C.-H. (2023). The Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Its Implications for China's Regional Policy. *Chinese Political Science Review*, 8, 63–83. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-022-00209-5>
- Yakymuk, I. (2023, May 12). Due to the slowdown in the "grain corridor" in Ukraine, factories may stop – the expert. *Suspilne Novyny*. <https://suspilne.media/473968-cerez-galmuvanna-roboti-zernovogo-koridoru-v-ukraini-mozut-zupinatisa-zavodi-ekspert-pro-zernovu-iniciativu/> [in Ukrainian].
- Zięba, R. (2023). Three Seas Initiative. In R. Zięba (Ed.). *Politics and Security of Central and Eastern Europe: Contemporary Challenges* (pp. 261–275). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16419-4_13

Ківалов С. "Фактор моря" у регіональному співробітництві: вплив російсько-української війни. – Стаття.

"Морський фактор" має вирішальний вплив на внутрішню та зовнішню політику прибережних держав і може створювати додаткові стимули для регіонального співробітництва та інтеграції. Російсько-українська війна, найбільший збройний конфлікт у Європі після Другої світової війни, стала стрес-тестом для багатьох регіональних транспортних та інфраструктурних проєктів. Крім того, цей збройний конфлікт у різних випадках мав різні наслідки. Для "Ініціативи трьох морів" російсько-українська війна стала додатковим стимулом для посилення співпраці. Це надало ініціативі нового змісту і навіть стимулювало її розширення через рішення про надання Україні статусу партнера. Водночас цей конфлікт мав негативні наслідки для китайської ініціативи "Один пояс, один шлях" (BRI). Війна також призвела до появи ще одного напряму співпраці між Україною та Туреччиною у Чорноморській зерновій ініціативі.

Ключові слова: Ініціатива трьох морів, BRI, Чорноморська зернова ініціатива, Україна, Росія, війна, збройний конфлікт.

