

МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ  
НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ «ОДЕСЬКА ЮРИДИЧНА АКАДЕМІЯ»

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О. Г. Томчаковський**

# **АНАЛІЗ НАУКОВОГО / ПРОФЕСІЙНОГО ТЕКСТУ**

*Методичні рекомендації для здобувачів вищої освіти  
III (освітньо-наукового) ступеня  
юридичних спеціальностей*

УДК 811.11:13(067)

А64

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Сергію Васильовичу Ківалову за сприяння у публікації видання*

**Аналіз** наукового / професійного тексту: методичні рекомендації для  
А64 здобувачів вищої освіти III (освітньо-наукового) ступеня юридичних  
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Методичні рекомендації призначені для здобувачів вищої освіти III (освітньо-наукового) ступеня юридичних спеціальностей. Методичні рекомендації містять 5 розділів, кожен з яких присвячений огляду особливостей того чи іншого типу наукових / професійних текстів, а також завдання для формування практичних навичок аналізу наукового / професійного дискурсу у здобувачів освіти.

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## ВСТУП

Методичні рекомендації призначені для здобувачів вищої освіти III (освітньо-наукового) ступеня юридичних спеціальностей.

В сучасному глобалізованому світі англійська мова є своєрідною *lingua franca* науки, техніки та освіти. Особливо важливу роль вона відіграє в науковій письмовій комунікації, про що свідчить невідоме зростання кількості публікацій англійською мовою не лише в міжнародних, а й у національних виданнях. Обізнаність із нормами й канонами сучасного англомовного наукового стилю і вміння представляти свої наукові здобутки англійською мовою є надзвичайно важливими для тих з українських учених, хто хоче активно спілкуватися зі своїми зарубіжними колегами і стати рівноправними членами міжнародних науково-освітніх спільнот.

Навчальна дисципліна «Іноземна мова (аналіз наукового/професійного тексту)» формує необхідний теоретичний і практичний базис знань з англійської мови як засобу комунікації у науково-професійному середовищі (читання літератури за фахом у режимах пошуково-інформативного, переглядового та аналітичного читання). Дисципліна синтезує знання фахових і мовних дисциплін та спрямована на ідентифікацію видів професійних текстів, аналіз та інтерпретування текстової інформації з англомовних джерел для виконання професійних завдань.

Метою вивчення дисципліни «Іноземна мова (аналіз наукового/професійного тексту)» є формування у здобувачів іншомовних компетентностей, достатніх для здійснення комунікації англійською мовою з високим рівнем техніки, логічності та грамотності мовлення для вирішення різноманітних фахових завдань, як під час подальшого навчання, так і у майбутній науковій/професійній діяльності.

В межах дисципліни «Аналіз наукового / професійного тексту» передбачено вивчення наступних тем:

Лекційні заняття				
Тема за п\п	Опис змісту навчання (теми)	Посилання на РН дисципліни	год. (денна ф/н)	год. (заочна ф/н)
Тема 1.	Загальна характеристика наукового функціонального стилю / General characteristics of scientific functional style	1,2,3,4,5	2	2

Практичні, лабораторні заняття				
Тема за п\п	Опис змісту навчання (теми)	Посилання на РН дисципліни	год. (денна ф/н)	год. (заочна ф/н)
Тема 1.	Загальна характеристика наукового функціонального стилю / General characteristics of scientific functional style	1,2,3,4,5	4	0
Тема 2.	Засади аналізу наукового тексту: композиційні, лексичні, синтаксичні особливості / Principles of scientific text analysis: compositional, lexical, syntactic features	1,2,3,4,5	4	2
Тема 3.	Контракт. Пошуково-інформативне, переглядове та аналітичне читання. Мовно-термінологічне опрацювання. Переклад / Contract. Search-informative, review and analytical reading. Linguistic and terminological processing. Translation.	1,2,3,4,5	4	2
Тема 4.	Наукова (науково-популярна) стаття. Пошуково-інформативне, переглядове та аналітичне читання. Мовно-термінологічне опрацювання.	1,2,3,4,5	6	2

	<p>Текстуальне і структурне оформлення.  Переклад і редагування / Scientific (popular scientific) article.  Search-informative, review and analytical reading.  Linguistic and terminological processing.  Textual and structural design.  Translation and editing.</p>			
Тема 5.	<p>Нормативно-правовий акт.  Пошуково-інформативне, переглядове та аналітичне читання.  Мовно-термінологічне опрацювання.  Текстуальне і структурне оформлення. Переклад / Legal act.  Search-informative, review and analytical reading.  Linguistic and terminological processing.  Textual and structural design.  Translation.</p>	1,2,3,4,5	6	2

Методичні рекомендації побудовано відповідно до зазначених тем та містять 5 розділів, кожен з яких містить стислий огляд особливостей того чи іншого типу текстів, а також практичні завдання для формування практичних навичок у здобувачів освіти.

## Unit 1. General characteristics of scientific functional style

70 per cent of our lifetime is spent in various forms of communication activities - oral (speaking, listening) or written (reading, writing). All scholars agree that a well developed language, such as English, is streamed into several functional styles. Their classifications, though, coincide only partially: most style theoreticians do not argue about the number of functional styles being five, but disagree about their nomenclature. Here is one of the rather widely accepted classifications which singles out the following functional styles:

1. *official style*, represented in all kinds of official documents and papers;
2. *scientific style*, found in articles, brochures, monographs and other scientific and academic publications;
3. *publicist style*, covering such genres as essay, feature article, public speeches, etc.;
4. *newspaper style*, observed in the majority of information materials printed in newspapers;
5. *belles-lettres style*, embracing numerous and versatile genres of imaginative writing.

It is only the first three that are invariably recognized in all stylistic treatises. As to the newspaper style, it is often regarded as part of the publicist domain and is not always treated individually.

Each of the enumerated styles is exercised in two forms - *written* and *oral*: an article and a lecture are examples of the two forms of the scientific style; news broadcast on the radio and TV or newspaper information materials - of the newspaper style; an essay and a public speech - of the publicist style, etc.

The number of functional styles and the principles of their differentiation change with time and reflect the state of the functioning language at a given period.

All the above-mentioned styles are singled out within the *literary type* of the language. Their functioning is characterized by the intentional approach of the speaker

towards the choice of language means suitable for a particular communicative situation and the official, formal, preplanned nature of the latter.

The *colloquial type* of the language, on the contrary, is characterized by the unofficiality, spontaneity, informality of the communicative situation. Sometimes the colloquial type of speech is labelled "the colloquial style" and entered into the classification of functional styles of the language, regardless of the situational and linguistic differences between the literary and colloquial communication, and despite the fact that a style of speech manifests a conscious, mindful effort in choosing and preferring certain means of expression for the given communicative circumstances, while colloquial speech is shaped by the immediacy, spontaneity, unpremeditativeness of the communicative situation. Alongside this consideration there exists a strong tendency to treat colloquial speech as an individual language system with its independent set of language units and rules of their connection [Retrieved from: [https://www.academia.edu/36825817\\_Kukhareno\\_V\\_A\\_A\\_Book\\_of\\_Practice\\_in\\_Stylistics](https://www.academia.edu/36825817_Kukhareno_V_A_A_Book_of_Practice_in_Stylistics)].

The main function of the scientific prose style is to provide factual and precise information, which must be clear, concise, unambiguous and explicit. There is no space for any redundant, repetitive and unimportant information. The target audience is a relatively small group of professionals who are well acquainted with the issue in question. The tone of the scientific text should be formal, impersonal and objective. Only standard variety of language is used. The whole text is predominantly written in the third person. The only place where the author can be heard and s/he can express her/his opinion is the conclusion. In order to follow the logical structure, the text usually consists of introduction/background, argument, conclusion and bibliography. To make the text credible, all the important statements in the text should be supported by references. The hierarchy of the whole text is also given by its organization into chapters, sections and subsections. In addition, the information is provided not only verbally but also with the help of illustrations, tables or graphs. Nowadays, more and more different media and modes are employed in the text in order to construct the meaning of the text, but also to make it more comprehensible and attractive to its



recipient. Therefore, scientific texts become hybrid in their nature because they do not consist only of one type of style and discourse. An example might be some of the scientific articles presented in Wikipedia. As far as the language is concerned, the most striking and visible style marker is in the use of professional expressions. The word term is understood as the word with clearly defined fixed meaning and can be easily identified without any context. Generally, the terminology has a tendency to internationalisms, for instance, chat, e-mail or manager. Besides the fixed terms, the scientific prose style uses half-terms or the subject-neutral vocabulary that is shared by all sciences, such as process, effect or feature. Another set of words characteristic of this style is bookish/archaic words, e.g. negligible or propagate.

The first 100 most frequent words of this style comprises the following units: a) prepositions: of, to, in, for, with, on, at, by, from, out, about, down; b) prepositional phrases: in terms of; in view of, in spite of, in common with, on behalf of, as a result of; by means of, on the ground of, in case of; c) conjunctive phrases: in order that, in case that, in spite of the fact that, on the ground that, for fear that; d) pronouns: one, it, we, they; e) notional words: people, time, two, like, man, made, years. A huge amount of connectors shows that the main purpose of the scientific prose texts is the logical sequence of utterances with clear indication of their interrelations and interdependence.

## **Unit 2. Principles of scientific text analysis: compositional, lexical, syntactic features**

### **Text analysis**

*(scientific functional style / academic writing)*

#### **1. Information about the author**

The text under analysis is an excerpt from the textbook on law/linguistics /biology... entitled....by a well-known British / American lawyer / linguist...

#### **2. Summary**

The given excerpt discusses .... (5-10 sentences)

#### **3. Functional style and its aim**

The given text belongs to the scientific prose style, the main aim of which is to give the reader certain information, to prove a hypothesis, to create new concepts, to disclose the internal laws of existence, relations between different phenomena.

#### **4. Compositional structure**

One of the most specific features of the given style is presented in the text. It is strict logical organization. The text is logically divided into two / three / four...paragraphs which are dedicated to certain aspects of the problem under discussion.

Logical argumentation is also achieved with the help of a wide system of connectives, e.g. *therefore, thus, for instance, however*.

#### **5. Lexical peculiarities**

Another peculiar feature of scientific style is found on the lexical level, namely the wide usage of linguistic terms, e.g. *modal, modality* (which is an example of root repetition of a key word), *surface syntax* etc. Quotation as a necessary part of any scientific work is also present here (the words of Gustave Flaubert and James Joyce given in inverted commas and followed by bibliographical references).

#### **6. Syntactical peculiarities**

The syntactic structure of the sentences is also characteristic of the given functional style – they are mostly long with a wide usage of passive structures and the Present Simple Tense. The wide usage of passive constructions can be explained by another peculiar feature of the academic writing – it tends to be impersonal and objective, logically persuasive, concentrating upon the object of investigation.

### **7. The polycode character of the text**

As for the polycode character of the text which is realized in using verbal and non-verbal (paragramemic) means of presenting information, here it is achieved by means of italics which singles out graphically and logically the most important of the discussed notions.

**or**

The polycode character of the text which is realized in using verbal and non-verbal means of presenting information, is achieved here by means of the picture of the US Supreme Court Building in Washington on the top of which the words “Equal Justice under Law” are written. These words are the basic principle of the US law system.

## **Unit 3. Contract. Search-informative, review and analytical reading.**

### **Linguistic and terminological processing. Translation**

A legal contract is a written document that is drawn up by a party and is agreed upon by all parties.

*Read the contract below. Specify its lingual features.*

*Write a detailed analysis of the text according to the scheme.*

#### **CONTRACT**

about provision of services (performance of works) in the field of informatization

Kyiv, Ukraine

May \_\_th, 2020

IT-WORLDWIDE-GROUP, the legal entity registered and acting under laws of \_\_\_\_\_, duly represented by director \_\_\_\_\_ acting on the basis of the articles of association, hereinafter referred to as “The Customer ” on the one hand, and

Private entrepreneur Developer QA, acting under laws of Ukraine, registration number (“The Contractor”)

Have agreed to execute this Contract about provision of services (performance of works) in the field of informatization (“The Contract”)

the parties agree as follows:

#### **1. SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT**

1.1. In accordance with the terms of this Contract, the Contractor, on the instructions of the Customer, undertakes in person to provide services (to perform works) in the field of informatization including, but not limited to:

- computer programming services;
- services in the development of standard software;
- other services in the field of software development;
- advising on informatization issues;
- work with databases;
- QA;

- data processing, information placement on Web sites and Web portals, and related activities;
- other services (work) in the field of information technology and computer systems required by the Customer.

1.2. The Parties confirm that during the execution of this Contract the Contractor acts as an independent contractor in accordance with the current civil law of Ukraine and in no case may be considered as a hired employee of the Customer or as its agent or representative.

1.3. For the provision of services (performance of works) within the framework of this Contract, the Customer shall provide the Contractor with the Technical Tasks (in writing or orally) containing the list, scope, timing and procedure for the provision of services (performance of works). The Terms of Reference may also include the price of specific services (works) and the procedure for their payment. Services are provided (works performed) by the Executor solely in accordance with the Customer's Technical Tasks, which become an integral part (in writing or orally) of this Agreement.

1.4. The Customer provides the Contractor with all information necessary for the provision of services (performance of works) under this Contract.

## **2. PRICE OF SERVICES (BUSINESS) AND PROCEDURE OF CALCULATIONS**

2.1. The total price of this Agreement is defined as the sum of the value of all services rendered (performed works), in accordance with the Acts of acceptance and transfer of services rendered by the Parties signed by the Parties (performed works) under this Agreement during its term of validity.

2.2. The cost of the Services (works) of the Contractor is determined by the Parties in the respective Terms of Reference.

2.3. The parties may agree on a partial or full advance payment for services (work).

2.4. The Parties have agreed that the Customer in any case makes an advance payment (prepayment) for this Agreement in the amount of XXXX Euro (XXXX Euro 00 eurocents) by transferring funds to the Contractor's current account within 10 (ten) Banking days from the date of signing by the Parties to this Agreement

2.5. Additional cost of services (works) payable under this contract is pre-estimated by the Parties in proportion to the volume of work and their complexity and shall be agreed upon by the Parties additionally in accordance with the Act of acceptance-transfer of services rendered (performed works).

2.6. The settlements between the Parties are made exclusively in Euro

### **3. ORDER OF IMPLEMENTATION AND RECEIVING SERVICES (WORKS)**

3.1 The Contractor renders services (performs work) to the Customer at his own risk and in person. At the same time, the Contractor has the right, with the consent of the Customer, to engage in the provision of services (performance of works) of other persons (subcontractors) while remaining responsible to the Customer for the result of their work. The involvement of other persons (subcontractors) in the provision of services (performance of works) should be carried out in full compliance with the terms of this Contract.

3.2 Transmission of the results of the Services (works) of the Contractor shall be made solely on the equipment provided by the Customer in order to respect the confidentiality of the information being transmitted. Such equipment remains the property of the Customer, and can not be used by the Contractor for purposes other than transfer of results of work.

3.3 In order to confirm the fact of the provision of services (performance of works) by the Contractor as a whole or the execution of a specific stage for a certain date, the Parties shall draw up an appropriate Acceptance Certificate for the services rendered

(performed works), which is a sufficient basis for making settlements with the Contractor.

3.4 The Contractor shall provide to the Customer two copies of the signed Acceptance-Transfer Service (performed work) within 15 (fifteen) calendar days after the completion of the provision of services (performance of works) as a whole or the completion of the execution of a specific stage in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

3.5 The Customer undertakes to sign two copies of the Acceptance-Transfer Service (performed work) submitted by the Contractor not later than 10 (ten) working days from the date of submission of their originals to the Customer by the Contractor and within the aforementioned time period provide one signed copy of the Acceptance-Transmission Act of the Services rendered (executed works) to the Contractor or to provide a reasoned refusal to sign this Act within the above term. In case of failure to provide to the Executor of the signed Act or the reasoned refusal, the services (work) in the aforementioned period will be deemed accepted, rendered in a proper manner and such that are to be paid by the Customer. In the case of a motivated refusal of the Customer of the Party within a period not later than 5 (five) working days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of a motivated refusal of the Customer, sign a protocol containing a list of significant deficiencies and the terms for their elimination. The Contractor shall, at his own expense, eliminate such shortcomings in the time indicated by the Customer. Acceptance of services (works) and signing of the corresponding Acceptance-Transfer Service (services performed) by the Customer shall be performed after the elimination of all deficiencies.

3.6 The quality of the services provided (performed work) must meet the requirements, standards, specifications, and other technical documentation applicable to this type of software products and services. The quality requirements for the results of the services provided (works performed) can be specified in the Terms of Reference.

#### **4. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES**

4.1. The Customer is obliged:

- To pay timely for the Services/ Works.
- To accept timely the results of the Services/ Works.
- To assist the Contractor in the provision/ performance of the Services/ Works.

4.2. The Customer has the right:

4.2.1. To monitor progress and /or quality of Services/Works provision/performance by the Contractor. The Customer has the right to entrust the conduct of such control to the third Party, in advance warning of the Contractor.

4.2.2. To receive from the Contractor all necessary information about the Services/Wworks provided.

4.2.3. To demand from the Contractor eliminating the defects and/ or deficiencies of the provided/performed Services/Works that are revealed during the work completion and acceptance period and next 12 (twelve) month after execution of the Acceptance Certificate .

4.3. The Contractor is obliged:

4.3.1. To provide/perform the Customer with the Services/Works specified in this Contract in a timely manner and on a highly skilled level.

4.3.2. Upon termination or in case of early termination of this Contract, to transfer to the Customer all materials, IPI, documents received from the Customer or created during the execution of this Contract, including, but not limited to: source materials, reports, graphic elements, source code, object code, source code, formula, specification, hardware design, business and commercial data, know-how, formulas, processes, designs, thumbnails, pictures, plans, drawings, technical requirements, sample reports, models, lists customers, price lists, researces, received data, computer programs, inventions, ideas, etc.



4.3.3. Not to use the results of the provision/performance of Services/Works under this Contract, including but not limited to: IPI received (created) in the execution of this Contract, for their own purposes and / or for the purpose of Third parties.

4.3.4. When creating an IPI not to use without any prior written consent of the Customer any objects of legal protection, copyright (including exclusive) right to which he does not belong. Terms of use of intellectual property rights of third parties will be agreed by the Parties in the Additional agreements to the Contract.

4.3.5. Not to install any software on the Customer's Equipment without the prior written consent of the latter; not to use the provided Equipment for the development of computer programs with signs of viruses, not to distribute and / or store materials in any form that contradict the principles of public morality (for example, materials of violence or pornography).

4.3.6. Not to install unlicensed software on the Customer's Equipment; not to use unlicensed software on the Equipment of the Customer; in case of detection of unlicensed software on the Customer's Devices, notify the Customer within two business days from the date of such detection.

4.3.7. To comply with the information security rules when fulfilling the Contract.

4.3.8. Upon request of the Customer to inform about the current state of the provision/performance of Services/Works in the terms and manner established by the Customer (by telephone, fax, by e-mail, etc.).

4.3.9. install on the equipment used for fulfillment of Orders, upon request of the Customer, the software for data protection, use such software during Orders execution, comply with the data protection requirements defined by the Customer if they do not contravene the provisions of this Contract.

4.4. The Contractor has the right:

4.4.1. To request the Customer the information needed for the provision/performance of Services/Works within the framework of this Contract, while the Customer has the

right to refuse to the Contractor to provide such information in order to protect the confidential information of their clients and/or partners. In case of impossibility of provision/performance of Services/Works due to failure to provide such information, the Contractor shall immediately notify the Customer thereof.

4.4.2. To independently determine the place of provision/performance of Services/Works.

4.4.3. To install and use on the Equipment of the Customer such software that meets the license requirements for free or Conditional Free Software.

4.4.4. To demand payment of the provision/performance of Services/Works in accordance with the terms of this Contract.

## **5. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARTIES AND SOLVING DISPUTES**

5.1. In the event of failure or improper performance of the obligations provided for in this Agreement, the Parties shall be liable in accordance with the laws of the Ukraine, unless otherwise specified in the relevant additional agreements to this Agreement.

5.2. The Parties shall not be liable for any lost profits related to breach of obligations under this Agreement.

5.3. For violation of the requirements of clauses 6.1, 6.3 and 6.6 of this Agreement, the Contractor is obligated to pay a fine of 10 000,00 (Ten Thousand euros, 00 euro cents) to the Client.

5.4. In case of disputes concerning the issues stipulated by this Agreement, the Parties will take all measures to resolve them by negotiation.

5.5 In the event that these disputes can not be resolved by negotiation, they are settled by Ukrainian courts in accordance Ukrainian legislation.

## **6. CONFIDENTIALITY**

6.1. The Parties undertake not to disclose to third parties any information that became known to them in connection with the signing of this Agreement and fulfillment of its obligations without the prior written consent of the other Party. The confidentiality obligations entrusted to the Parties by this Agreement are valid throughout the term of the Agreement and within the next 3 (three) years after the termination / termination of its validity. Not considered a violation of the provisions of this section of the Agreement, providing information to third parties with the consent of the Customer, for the implementation of paragraph 3.1. this Agreement.

6.2. Confidential information means any information provided to the Executor by the Customer in a document (in paper, electronic or oral form) including but not limited to: scientific, business and commercial data, know-how, formulas, processes, designs, sketches, photographs plans, drawings, technical requirements, sample reports, models, customer lists, price lists, research, data obtained, computer programs, inventions, ideas, as well as any other information provided in the framework of this Agreement; information contained in this Agreement and information on the conclusion and existence of this Agreement.

6.3. The Contractor undertakes, at the request of the Customer, in particular, in case of termination of this Agreement or expiration of its term, to return and / or destroy all the documentation, programs, data, source code of the programs, results (protocols) of testing from all information carriers transferred to him.

6.4. The information will not be considered confidential and the Contractor will not be bound by such information if it meets at least one of the following conditions:

- already known to the Contractor before the conclusion of the Agreement;
- Received legally from a third party outside the context of this Agreement;
- disclosed publicly by the Customer;

- disclosed by a substantiated written request of a state body whose authority in obtaining such information is determined by the current legislation of Ukraine;
- is allowed to be distributed with the written consent of the Customer.

In each of these cases, the Contractor shall provide the Customer written explanations in each case of disclosure or leakage of information with documentary evidence of the legality of their actions within 10 calendar days from the date of receipt of a written request from the Customer.

6.5. The relations of the Parties under this Privacy Contractual Agreement are governed by the Agreement on Confidentiality, which the Parties conclude at the same time as the conclusion of this Agreement. The Contractor, for the purpose of protecting confidential and commercial information about the economic activities of the Customer, without the Customer's consent, undertakes not to have direct or indirect (through third parties) contacts with any Customer's clients (including potential – legal entities or individuals – entrepreneurs, which engage in activities similar to those of the client of the Customer), if such contacts cause or may harm the financial or other interests of the Customer, to reduce the expected profits.

6.6. The Contractor shall not have the right to enter into commercial relations with the Customer's contractors without the Customer's prior consent during the term of the Contract and for the next 3 years after its termination.

## **7. RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OBJECTS**

7.1. The parties have agreed that all exclusive property rights to objects of intellectual property that will be created in the course of execution by the Contractor of this Agreement, namely:

- the right to use the object of intellectual property,
- the exclusive right to authorize the use of an intellectual property object;

- the exclusive right to interfere with the unlawful use of the object of intellectual property, including prohibiting such use,  
- as well as other rights that exist today or will exist in the future,  
belong to the Customer.

7.2. The exclusive right to use an intellectual property object allows the Customer to use it in any form and in any way and without any conditions.

7.3. The exclusive right of the Customer to permit or prohibit the use of an object of intellectual property that will be created under this Agreement gives him the right to authorize or prohibit:

- 1) reproduction of the object of intellectual property;
- 2) public demonstration and public display;
- 3) any re-disclosure of an object of intellectual property, if it is carried out by another organization than the one that made the first disclosure;
- 4) translations of the object of intellectual property;
- 5) processing, adaptation, arrangement and other similar changes to the object of intellectual property;
- 6) the inclusion of the object of intellectual property as an integral part of other objects of intellectual property;
- 7) the alienation of an object of intellectual property in any way or by way of lease or lease, or through another transfer to the first sale of copies of an object of intellectual property;
- 8) alienation by any method of the original or copies of the object of intellectual property;
- 9) import, export of copies of the object of intellectual property,  
and any other uses that exist today and those that will exist in the future.

7.4. The exclusive proprietary rights of the Customer for the objects of intellectual property, created in the course of execution by the Contractor of this Agreement, extend both to the finished object of intellectual property and to the materials received during its development, the resulting audiovisual displays, regardless of language and form Expression, including source text and object code.

7.5. The author's remuneration for the use of intellectual property objects (results of work) and the transfer of the author's exclusive property rights to them to the Customer is taken into account in the amount of payment for services (works).

7.6. The possession of the Exclusive Property Rights by the Customer shall remain valid for the whole term of copyright in all territories, including other states.

7.7. Developed in the course of implementation of this Agreement, the ideas, know-how, methods and other information developed by the Contractor in any way can be used indefinitely by the Customer in their own activities without any obligations regarding the Contractor.

7.8. The Contractor guarantees that the services (works) provided to the Customer do not violate the copyright and patent rights, trade secrets and other rights of third parties, and in case of violation of such rights, it undertakes to resolve all claims and / or at its own expense on its own account and / or at its own expense. the claims of such third parties.

## **8. FORCE MAJOR**

8.1. The parties shall be released from responsibility for failure to fulfill and / or improper fulfillment of obligations under this Agreement in the event of circumstances of force majeure such as: adoption by the state authorities of regulatory acts that significantly impede the implementation of the Treaty, earthquakes, floods, fires, typhoons, hurricanes, hostilities, massive diseases (epidemics, epizootics), traffic constraints, the prohibition of commercial operations with individual countries as a

result of the application of international sanctions, as well as other similar circumstances that is dependent on the will of the Parties (hereinafter – the “force majeure”).

8.2. A party that has been subjected to force majeure circumstances is obliged to notify the other Party within five days from the date of occurrence of such circumstances.

8.3. In cases of force majeure circumstances, the terms of fulfillment by the Parties of obligations under this Agreement shall be extended in proportion to the time during which such Force Majeure Circumstances and / or their consequences are in force.

8.4. The party referring to the Force Majeure Circumstances shall, in support of such influence, be obliged to provide a document issued by the competent state authority or the relevant Chamber of Commerce and Industry or its branch.

8.5. If Force Majeure circumstances last more than six months, each Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by returning to the other Party all property or cash received in advance for the execution of this Agreement by the end of its term. Neither Party has the right to demand other compensation for possible losses.

## **9. PERSONAL DATA**

9.1. The Contractor hereby agrees to collect, process and transfer his personal data (in particular, to receive, add to the database, distribution, transfer to third parties, addition or other modification, destruction and other actions that the Customer may make with his personal data in writing ( electronic, and other forms, including, but not limited to, the following: name, surname, patronymic, date of birth, passport details, identification number, data Extracts from the unified state register of legal entities and sole proprietors, in inc. with respect to the topic of taxation, qualification information, communication number, electronic identification data (IP-address, telephone, e-mail), residence data, as well as other data voluntarily provided by them in order to ensure the implementation of civil law and economic legal relations, conducting settlements

with the Contractor, accounting and tax accounting, for communication and contractual relations with state authorities, counteragents and other third parties in the course of economic activities, as well as for other purposes that are not violating current legislation. The Contractor hereby acknowledges his agreement that, if necessary, his personal data may be processed and provided to third parties.

9.2. The parties undertake, in accordance with the requirements of European legislation on the protection of personal data, to ensure adequate protection of personal data from unlawful processing as well as against unlawful access to them, including taking necessary measures to prevent disclosure of personal data by employees and / or other authorized persons of the Parties, by whom such personal data was entrusted or became known to them in connection with the performance of duties under this Agreement.

9.3 The Contractor agrees that the Customer is not responsible for any processing, failure to ensure access and protection of personal data by the Contractor by third parties, including employees of the Customer, if the provision of access to such personal data (or other action that created the possibility of further unauthorized processing by third parties) was made by the Customer or another person at the permission of the Contractor outside the performance of duties under this Agreement for personal purposes or for other purposes not related to the performance of duties under this Agreement. Om, using technical means or other materials / equipment customer.

## **10. TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT**

10.1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature by the Parties and shall expire on December 31, 20XX, but not before the full and proper fulfillment by the Parties of their obligations under the Treaty.

10.2 Upon expiration of the Agreement, the Agreement shall be automatically extended for each subsequent calendar year unless either Party notifies the other Party of its wish



to terminate the Agreement no later than 30 (thirty) calendar days before the date of termination of the Agreement.

10.3 Each Party has the right at any time to terminate this Agreement, in writing (by registered letter), warning the other Party within 30 (thirty) calendar days before the desired date of termination. The date of receipt of the letter from either of the Parties is deemed to be the moment of notification. Accordingly, the date of termination of the Agreement shall come to an end 30 (thirty) calendar days from the receipt of the letter of termination by the Party.

10.4 The Customer has the right to terminate the Agreement unilaterally without observing the terms established in clause 10.3 of this Contract if:

4. a) The Contractor has violated clauses 4.3.1. – 4.3.6. this Agreement;
5. b) The Contractor has sustained losses or violated the Customer's commercial interests.
6. c) If there are valid reasons, such as further disadvantage or termination of the Customer's project, changing the conditions in the market of software products, changing business plans of the Customer, lack of funds to finance works, etc. In this case, the Customer undertakes to pay to the Contractor the services (work) provided (executed) and unpaid to the moment of termination of this Agreement, and the Contractor, if he receives a prepayment for the services (work) in accordance with clause 2.3. of this Agreement, undertakes to reimburse the Customer over-paid by the Customer in full within 10 (ten) working days after the termination of this Agreement.

## **11. OTHER CONDITIONS**

11.1. The amendments, supplements and appendices to this Agreement are an integral part thereof and are valid if they are stated in writing and signed by the authorized representatives of the Parties.

11.2. In case of any changes: legal status, tax system, location and registration, bank or other details, contacts, the Contractor is required to file a written statement about this to the Customer within 10 days from the moment of their occurrence. In case of late communication, the Contractor shall indemnify the Customer for all losses incurred by the Customer in connection with such untimely communication.

11.3 This Agreement is drawn up in Ukrainian and English in duplicate, each of which has the same legal validity.

## **12. DETAILS OF THE PARTIES**

### **CUSTOMER**

### **CONTRACTOR**

[Retrieved from <https://zilver.com.ua/en/sample-of-the-contract-with-it-contractor-ukraine/> ]

**Unit 4. Scientific (popular scientific) article. Search-informative, review and analytical reading. Linguistic and terminological processing. Textual and structural design. Translation and editing**

*Read the article. Write a detailed analysis of the text according to the scheme.*

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- Social scientific investigations of police policy and activity
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- Management oriented research on aspects of police organisation

Space is also devoted to the relationship between what the police do and the policing decisions and functions of communities, private sector organisations and other state agencies.

As such, the journal is of vital interest to academics involved in the scholarly study of all of the varied facets of contemporary policing, as well as police and other practitioners involved in social regulation and control.

*Policing & Society* is renowned for its genuinely international scope and has correspondents in most countries where there is a tradition of academic inquiry into all aspects of policing. The journal is committed to rigorous policy debate and the very highest standards of scholarship [<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=gpas20>].

**INVESTIGATIVE PRIVATE POLICING BEYOND THE POLICE: AN  
EXPLORATORY STUDY**

**Mark Button**, **Richard Kapend** & **Peter Stiernstedt**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper is based on a survey of 331 private investigators predominantly based or working in the UK. It offers findings on the background, roles undertaken, tools used and outcomes of their work. It divides the investigators into four main groups: private investigators (or detectives), investigators working for forensic accountants, in-house private investigators and in-house public investigators (non-police). Given the lack of research on this segment of private policing, important exploratory findings are presented which can be used as the foundations of further research in this rarely investigated sector. The paper illustrates the dominance of older men in second careers among private investigators, the dominance of fraud investigation as the most common work undertaken and limited involvement in surveillance. The paper also presents significant findings on the number of persons who face some form of justice as a result of their investigations.

## **Introduction**

Since the work of Shearing and Stenning (Stenning and Shearing Citation<sup>1979</sup>, Shearing *et al.* Citation<sup>1980</sup>, Shearing and Stenning Citation<sup>1987</sup>) in the late 1970s and early 1980s began to expose the important contribution of private security to policing, there has been a growing scholarship on the subject (see for example, South Citation<sup>1988</sup>, Johnston Citation<sup>1992</sup>, Jones and Newburn Citation<sup>1998</sup>). This body of work, however, has been largely directed at the uniformed aspects of private policing (Rigakos Citation<sup>2002</sup>, Wakefield Citation<sup>2003</sup>, Crawford *et al.* Citation<sup>2005</sup>, Thumala *et al.* Citation<sup>2011</sup>, Löfstrand *et al.* Citation<sup>2016</sup>, Nalla *et al.* Citation<sup>2017</sup>). The private security sector is a very large and diverse industry with many sub-segments, some of which have escaped extensive academic scrutiny (Cunningham *et al.* Citation<sup>1990</sup>). One of these is investigation services provided for fees and in-house within organisations.

Given the commercial side of private investigation (often referred to as private detectives and investigators) has had a long history of controversy, this lack of attention would seem surprising (see for example Weiss Citation<sup>1978</sup>). In the UK, there have

been a series of scandals that have involved private investigators, most notably, the use of illegal surveillance and blagging methods to secure private information for the tabloid press and for clients (Information Commissioner's Office Citation<sup>2006</sup>, Serious Organised Crime Agency [SOCA] Citation<sup>2008</sup>, Home Affairs Committee Citation<sup>2012</sup>, Leveson Citation<sup>2012</sup>). The controversy surrounding this function, one should have thought, would have stimulated more academic interest. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The most significant studies to date in the UK were led by Gill *et al.* and conducted in the late 1990s, almost 25 years ago (see, Gill and Hart Citation<sup>1997a</sup>, Citation<sup>1997b</sup>, Citation<sup>1999</sup>). This research also focused exclusively on private investigators and did not explore the substantial in-house sector and other specialist providers of investigative services, such as investigators working for forensic accountants.

This paper seeks to try and fill the gap in knowledge on the activities of those engaged in private investigation. It is an exploratory study with the aim of providing baseline data that can be used by authors and other researchers to develop further ideas for research from some of the very interesting findings uncovered. Drawing upon a survey of 331 investigators, this paper seeks to offer insights on who are private investigators (in the broader sense), who they work for and what they do, the tools they use and who they work for, to name some. The paper will begin by briefly exploring some of the limited research which has been undertaken, before setting out the methodology and then presenting some of the main findings from the survey.

#### *Private investigators: what we do know?*

Button (Citation<sup>2019</sup>) distinguishes three main groups of investigators that are involved in private investigation: private investigators who charge fees to clients for investigative services; professional service practices based in the accountancy and legal sectors who also offer investigative services for fees; and in-house investigators of private and public organisations.

The public in-house contribution is also important to be considered because they conduct many investigations for the organisations they are employed by. Some might argue their location in the public sector should exclude them from this paper. These

investigators, however, are predominantly serving their organisations to protect their revenues and expenditure. They are not like the public police where any member of the public can call them with an issue and expect some form of response. In the UK, there are some in-house public investigators who have special powers in relation to securing information (such as DWP/HMRC), but most do not have any special powers (Gilbert and Wakefield Citation2018). They are essentially providing an in-house and private function for their employer who just happens to be located in the public sector, which is very different from the public police or other policing bodies like trading standards officers, regulators, etc., who are not only located in the public sector, but also serve the public responding to their complaints and queries. Drawing the line in dividing public from private policing is also a contested area with no clear consensus (see Johnston Citation1992, Jones and Newburn Citation1998, Button Citation2019). It is, therefore, important to explore their contribution and even if you are not convinced, they are part of the private sphere; they at least serve as a point of comparison, whether 'private', 'hybrid' or 'public'.

Of these three groups (private investigators, in-house private and in-house public), private investigators have secured the most academic attention (see, e.g. Stiernstedt Citation2022), but are still relatively less. These agents are often also known as 'private detectives', 'private eyes', 'gumshoes' or 'enquiry agents' to name some (Prenzler Citation2006, p. 423). There is much debate on the definitions and boundaries of this group, but most would regard it as a distinct sub-sector of the private security industry (Cunningham et al. Citation1990, George and Button Citation2000). Gill and Hart (Citation1999, p. 247) defined them simply as, 'an individual who either runs or is employed by a business which provides investigative services for a fee'. Prenzler (Citation2006, p. 423) offered something similar, 'individuals operating a business that conducts inquiries for a client for a fee, or an employee of such a firm'. The simplicity of some of these definitions provides for a much broader range of potential activities such as market researchers and even journalists.

There are also investigators employed in-house in organisations, in both the private and public sectors. In the former, many financial services companies employ

investigative staff to deal with fraud, but other large organisations may also employ investigators to look into a wide range of workplace crimes and deviance (see Ericson *et al.* Citation2003, Williams Citation2005, Stenström Citation2018). There has been research on in-house corporate security/investigation (Nalla and Morash Citation2002, Petersen Citation2013, Walby and Lippert Citation2014) and in-house public investigators, particularly dedicated towards welfare fraud (Cook Citation1989, Button *et al.* Citation2007, Prenzler Citation2017, Gilbert and Wakefield Citation2018, Wilcock Citation2019, Headworth Citation2021). The professional service practices based in the accountancy and legal sectors have received virtually no serious scholarly interest (Digabriele Citation2008, Hegazy *et al.* Citation2017) and broader studies exploring the nature of their investigations (Gottschalk Citation2017, Citation2020).

In the UK, there have been few systematic attempts to estimate the size of the sector. Research commissioned by the UK regulator, the Security Industry Authority, estimated 2968 private investigator organisations employing between 4400 and 10,000, but with a possibility of 17,000 (Judes Citation2010). The Cabinet Office estimates there could be as many as 15,000 employed in central government countering fraud, many of which conduct investigations (some might be in intelligence and prevention work) (HMG, Citationn.d.). There are also charities, local government and in-house investigators in private organisations. A conservative estimate based on this would be around 30,000 investigators in the UK, although this is clearly a punt – although a reasonable one – and an area in need of more research.

Given the central aim of this paper is to offer insights on who the investigators are and what they do, the focus here will be on past research which has examined this in the UK, although there is some research in Australia and other countries (King Citation2012, Citation2020, Prenzler and King Citation2002, Citation2021, Prenzler Citation2006; Walby and Monaghan, Citation2011). Gill and Hart (Citation1997a, p. 553) in their survey of 206 private investigator agencies found that the following services have been provided in the previous 12 months:

- Process serving 90.3%.

- Road traffic accident enquiries 80.6%.
- Claims investigations 71.8%.
- Matrimonial enquiries 68.4%.
- Criminal investigations 53.4%.
- Fraud investigations 50%.
- Asset tracing 50.5%.

The Gill and Hart research did not offer much on the profile of the actual investigators other than some of the traits that were sought in persons they recruited (Gill and Hart Citation1997a). Gottschalk (Citation2017, Citation2020) has provided useful case studies of actual investigations conducted, largely by those employed in accountancy firms, but did not provide a profile of investigators. Regarding counter fraud specialists largely operating in the public sector, Button *et al.* (Citation2007) found:

- Near gender parity: 54.5% male, 45.5% female.
- Middle -aged dominance: 69% 35–54 and only 22.3% 34 or less.
- Education: 26% graduates or postgraduates and 74% educated to 18.
- Past experience: 19.5% ex-military or police.

We can, therefore, conclude on the literature examined:

- There are data on what private investigative agencies do (but it is dated)
- There is very little data on who private investigators are.
- There are data on who in-house investigators in the public sector are, but focused on fraud and also dated.
- There are no data on who in-house private investigators are and what they do.
- There is limited data on who professional service investigators employed by forensic accountants are and what they do.

This paper will seek to fill this gap by offering exploratory findings on the profile of these investigators. It is important to also note the aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive set of findings, but rather to offer a broad up-to-date picture, which provides clues for other researchers to develop research ideas in this under-developed



area. Before the findings from this research are presented, the methods for the paper will be outlined.

## **Methods**

Data collection in a professional and/or business setting is commonly done by distributing a survey, and was so in this research project. It is, however, important when undertaking a survey to understand who the participants are and how to survey these particular participants, i.e. what to ask to elicit rich data (see, e.g. MacDonald and Headlam Citation2008). This first challenge meant that the survey had to be designed in a way such that it would minimise the chance of potential misunderstandings or ambiguities (see Gadd and Karstedt Citation2011) which will lead to an emphasis on clear, understandable, and professional questions (see Bryman Citation2012). Practically, this was operationalised in a three-step process. The first step entailed the research team designing survey questions, in the second step those questions went out for consultation to colleagues with significant experience in survey design. This led to several of the questions being reformatted. The third step occurred after the survey was uploaded to the online tool JISC Online Surveys, where another round of review was undertaken to ensure the clarity of the questions and survey.

The invitation later stated that ‘the study aims to understand the background of non-police investigators, the types of investigations they engage in, the tools and strategies used and your views on some important issues such as regulation and privatisation’. The survey, thus, was divided into four corresponding sections, where the first contained some demographic questions. The second explored investigators’ backgrounds and status. This covered both individual aspects such as academic qualifications and professional associations, as well as organisational such as annual turnover and country(-ies) of operations. The third section covered the work of private investigators. The questions revolved around caseload and the different types of investigations, techniques, tools, and clients. There were also many free-text questions where participants were asked to enter percentages. Since there was no fixed formatting of these questions, the data format of the answer varied to an extent, but was nevertheless easy to code once collated. For example, in the analysis entries like ‘zero’

and ‘all’ were transformed to ‘0%’ and ‘100%’, respectively. The fourth and final sections of the survey examined the views held by private investigators. These views mainly revolved around the regulatory environment in which they operate.

Unlike some occupations, there is no easily accessible list of investigators to send the questionnaire to. However, private investigators – as concerns offering their services for hire – generally publicise themselves, including an email contact. The researchers used the following lists:

- Association of British Investigators (<https://www.theabi.org.uk/>).
- UK Professional Investigators Network (<https://www.ukpin.com/index.html>).
- General Google search.

From these sources, the researchers built a database of 460 firms in the UK offering investigation services with a contact email to which a questionnaire was sent. The UKPIN was also supportive of the research and sent an email encouraging the members to respond. To secure forensic accountants, researchers targeted the top 20 accountancy firms, which listed forensics as an area of expertise and also used the contacts on the Network of Independent Forensic Accountants (<https://nifa.co.uk/>), although only 33 were listed. Generally, the top 20 firms would have only one contact listed, so reaching their staff beyond the named contact was purely at their goodwill. To secure in-house investigators, the researchers used their professional networks and secured the distribution or publicity of the survey link among the following:

- University of Portsmouth database of fraud contacts.
- Midlands Fraud Forum.
- Cabinet Office Knowledge Hub.
- ACFE (UK).
- Security Institute.
- Researchers’ LinkedIn networks.

Some of these networks also cover private investigators and forensic accountants. The distribution encouraged participants to share. Securing in-house private responses was a much more challenging task because of the lack of a relevant association and coordinating body. Public investigators in central government, particularly fraud-related,

were much easier to target due to the Cabinet Office infra-structure professionalising and co-ordinating them. The researchers are, therefore, confident that the survey reached a good proportion of private investigators listed in the UK, public in-house investigators, but are less confident of the private in-house investigators and forensic accountants' staff. A total of 339 responses were received, of which, after scrutiny, eight were excluded for limited responses and/or not relevant. It is also important to note that the nature of distribution meant some responses were from investigators based beyond the UK, with 87% of respondents primarily based in the UK. However, some of the remaining investigators often worked in the UK, even though based in another country, and for this reason, the researchers have assessed the total sample. It is also important to note that because of the methods used to target investigators, only descriptive statistics will be presented as more sophisticated analysis would have been pointless. The findings should be considered as exploratory and a basis for further quantitative and qualitative research.

### **Ethical considerations**

This research has an aspect of ethical considerations where the methodological approach to the research ethics is based on the guidance issued by the British Psychological Society [BPS] (Citation2018). The approach was further guided by the work of Israel and Hay (Citation2011, pp. 502–508) outlining research ethics in terms of (a) informed consent about the purpose of the research; (b) maintaining confidentiality of research participants' identity and personal data; as well as (c) preventing participants from harm; and (d) at the same time, maintaining research integrity.

The main objective from an ethics perspective is that disclosures do not cause harm to the participants and their organisations. Further, as argued by Oliver (Citation2009), research does not exist in a 'moral vacuum', and while research aimed to enhance the body of knowledge, and in a sense, doing good, it follows that the facilitation of research or its results should not have detrimental effects on the participants, researcher or any other third party. Therefore, participation in this research is completely anonymous. Note the difference between data being anonymised and the

data being intrinsically anonymous – also to the researchers. There were, however, free-text answers as part of data collection, where potential identifiers could be entered. This risk was, nevertheless, mitigated by the fact that all participants were experienced professionals operating in a field where they would be accustomed to maintaining confidentiality. Ethical approval was secured from the University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee, Number: FHSS 2020-044.

## **Findings**

In the original questionnaire, private investigators could indicate if they were sole traders or working as more than one. These were combined for analysis and the small number of those working for private security companies were also added to create this private category. These are all agents charging fees for investigative services. Forensic includes those working for accountancy/consultancy firms (usually described as forensic accountancy), who also charge fees for investigative services. Given accountancy or limited liability partnerships (LLPs) are a clearly established sector in their own right, these were treated as a different category. There are also investigators working in-house for either the public or private sectors and each has separate categories. As noted earlier, we made the case for including in-house public investigators, which, even if this is debatable to some, at the very least, provides a point of comparison. Finally, there was a small number that did not fit into any of these categories, such as those working for lawyers, other enforcement agencies, international bodies to name some. Table 1 illustrates that 37.5% of our respondents were private investigators working for fees, 8.8% working for forensic accountants, just short of 30% in-house public investigators and just short of 20% private in-house (Table 1).

Table 1. Survey responses by the category of investigators.

[Download CSVDisplay Table](#)

## **Demographics of investigators**

The demographics of the investigators in the sample produced some interesting results. Among all investigators, it is a male-dominated occupation with around three-quarters male and a quarter female. However, for in-house public investigators, the

balance was closer with 59.2% male and 38% female. This is similar to what Button *et al.* (Citation2007) found among counter fraud specialists, who are largely public in-house investigators of fraud. Male dominance was highest among private investigators at almost 90%, with lower rates – but still, a clear dominance among forensic accountants (72.4%) and in-house private investigators (76.9%) (Table 2).

Table 2. Gender of investigators.

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

Those same male-dominated private investigators were also older too, with around 86.3%, 41 years or over, and almost three-quarters 51 and over. Also, 37% of private investigators were 61+, which was under 9% for the other three main categories. Across the whole sample of investigators, an older profile was the norm with just under 80% being 41 and over. The youngest profile was among forensic accountant-based investigators with almost 45% being 40 or under. In-house private investigators also had around a third in this age category. For the in-house public investigators, the age profile was dominated by the 41–60 with almost three-quarters in this age group (Table 3).

Table 3. Age of investigators.

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

The investigators in the sample were generally well educated with just over 62% educated to a degree or postgraduate level. The most educated groups were the forensic accountants and private in-house investigators with around 83% and 78%, respectively, educated at least to the degree level. The least educated were the private investigators, with 31.5% who left education at age 16, and a further 21.8% at age 18. Also, just over 37% of in-house public investigators left education at the maximum age of 18 (Table 4).


Table 4. Education of investigators.

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

The respondents were also asked about their previous employment and membership in any professional associations. From the 331 responses, the most common association that respondents belonged to was the Association of British

Investigators (ABI) with 59 indicating this association, which, given the methodology is not surprising. The second most common was the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) with 47 responses and 35 were members of HM Government Counter Fraud Profession. Given there were 331 respondents and the numbers who were members of associations was relatively low, no sub-analysis was undertaken for this question by types of investigator (Figure 1).

*Figure 1. Membership in a relevant professional association.  
Note: Total numbers not percentages.*



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The respondents included a large number of former police officers (uniformed and detective); of the 331, 73 had served as uniformed police officers and 80 as police detectives, with a total of 102 or 30% having any police background (served as a uniformed officer and/or detective). For private investigators, 58 of the 124 participants had some police background – almost half. This was much higher than the other segments, where only 15 of the 98 public in-house investigators were ex-police and 18 of the 67; a quarter was in-house private, with a similar proportion among the forensic. For private investigators, there were also 38 from other in-house private organisations, 26 from ex-military backgrounds and 13 from other in-house public, who were private investigators. The sample also included 18 former security services (MI5, MI6, etc.) employees, the vast majority of which (11) were working as private investigators (Table 5).

*Table 5. Former occupations of investigators .*

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### **What do investigators do?**

Based on a previous research of what investigators do and an assessment of some private investigator's offers on their websites, the researchers asked respondents to rate how often they undertake a variety of different functions on a scale of 1–4, where 1 is frequently, 2 is occasionally, 3 is rarely and 4 is never. The responses were turned into mean responses to give an indication of the most common activities undertaken. The closer to 1 is the score, the more often they are undertaken; the closer to 4, the less they are. Table 6 provides an analysis of these responses by all and the four main sub-groups.

*Table 6. Investigations conducted in the past three years.*

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Across all four sub-groups, fraud investigation was the most commonly undertaken function scoring 1.44 across all, 1.69 for private investigators, 1.14 for forensic accountants, 1.28 for public in-house and 1.29 for in-house private. Given there has been a substantial increase in fraud in the last two decades and the police response has been limited, this is arguably not surprising (Loveday Citation<sub>2017</sub>). The results make for an interesting contrast to the Gill and Hart (Citation<sub>1997a</sub>) research on private investigators which found that fraud investigations were the sixth most common activity, with process serving and road traffic accidents coming second and third, respectively. The nature of the distribution used – where fraud networks were targeted – could explain the dominance of fraud for in-house public and private, but this would not be the case for private investigators and to a lesser extent, forensic accountant investigators. It is clearly an area in need of further research.

In this research, private investigators' second most common activity was open source intelligence investigations scoring 1.79, third was due diligence investigations scoring 2.36, ranking the same as missing person investigations, process serving was fourth with a score of 2.38, staff theft and misconduct scoring 2.45 and 2.48,

respectively. The least undertaken activities were electronic counter measures at 3.34, genealogy at 3.16 and corporate espionage at 3.04.

Open-source investigations were the second most common activity across all four sub-groups, perhaps illustrating the growing ubiquity of the internet and associated resources that can be used to exploit for information gathering. Forensic accountants scored highly on this at 1.93 and were the most likely to conduct bribery/corruption investigations scoring 2.04, which compared to 2.82 for private investigators, 2.97 for in-house public and 2.37 for in-house private. Gottschalk (Citation2017, Citation2019) has also illustrated corruption-related investigations conducted by firms of forensic accountants.

In-house public investigators follow a similar profile at the top, with fraud and open source investigations first and second, but third was staff misconduct at 2.69, followed by staff theft, corruption and money laundering with scores of 2.93 and 2.97, for the latter two. All other activities scored 3+. In-house private were slightly more diverse in activities scoring: fraud, 1.29; open source, 1.89; staff misconduct, 2.09; staff theft 2.25, corruption 2.37, cybercrime 2.76, third party 2.9; and money laundering 2.93.

Surveillance is an important function of many state police and security agencies (Newburn and Hayman Citation2012). There are lots of anecdotal evidence of non-state agencies conducting surveillance (Information Commissioners' Office Citation2006, SOCA Citation2008, Leveson Citation2012). Respondents were asked to rate how often they do this on the same four-point scale used for this type of activity. The responses in Table 7 show that most in the sample conducting surveillance were something they either never did or rarely did. The most common form of surveillance was directed (such as following people on foot or in vehicles), which scored 2.87 across the whole sample. It was more common among private investigators, where the score was 2.17, which compared to 3.93 among forensic accountants, 3.25 in-house public investigators and 3.17 for in-house private. Covert surveillance (hidden cameras/listening devices) – which, depending on the context could also be illegal for some – was rarer with an overall mean score of 3.24, but again,



private investigators used this technique the most with a mean score of 2.83. Covert surveillance involving computers/smartphones was marginally less common in the total sample – scoring 3.24, but generally among the sub-groups, all scoring in the 3 s indicating a rare or never used tool. Covert investigations involving either physical or cyber impersonation of another person in the total sample were also either rare or not undertaken by most scoring 3.45 and 3.47, respectively. However, private investigators going undercover scored 2.9, indicating more involvement in this type of activity. The use of drones for surveillance was something most never did across all four groups, with the group using the most private investigators, scoring 3.72.

*Table 7. Types of surveillance undertaken by investigators.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

These results indicate that for most non-police investigators, surveillance is either rare or not something they do. Private investigators are an exception with greater involvement in directed and covert surveillance and going undercover. Forensic accountant based investigators are the least likely to use surveillance in general, but it is also something in-house investigators in the public and private sectors use rarely, if ever. Surveillance is a skilled function and evidence suggests there is a small pool of investigators who hire themselves to others when this activity is required in an investigation.

As well as asking what the investigators investigate and the type of surveillance used, data was also sought on what they do. Table 8 offers findings on the use of interviews of persons under caution. For this type of question, more accurate data on usage was sought which related to never, rarely, monthly, weekly, and daily. A third of the sample never did this, with private investigators using it the least, with nearly half of them never using it. Only 12% of in-house public investigators never did this, around 21% of forensic and around 37% of in-house private. If at least monthly is considered, over half of the in-house public investigators did so, just over a third of in-house private investigators, but only around a fifth of forensic investigators and private investigators. Other research has found that public bodies are more likely to pursue criminal sanctions and private bodies are a much greater mix (Button *et*

al. Citation2015, Citation2018). As interviews under caution are necessary for criminal prosecutions, these findings further support this. However, a third of in-house private doing this, at least monthly, illustrate that many private organisations wish to keep all options open, including criminal prosecutions.

*Table 8. Frequency of interviews, individuals under caution (police regulations such as PACE) or equivalent.*

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A tool often linked with private investigators is social engineering or blagging. This is where investigators pretend to be a person or an official to secure information. Over 80% of forensic employed investigators never did this, almost two-thirds of in-house public investigators, but for private in-house, it was 38%, and private investigators 41%. Indeed, around a third of private investigators and in-house private investigators were doing this on at least a monthly basis (Table 9).

*Table 9. Frequency of use of social engineering.*

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An important objective of this research was to understand the tools investigators use. Tables 10–18 illustrate the frequency at which various investigators used different tools. Both Tables 10 and 11 illustrate the generally rare use of specialist databases and data-analytical tools among these investigators. The largest use was the private investigators' use of specialist databases with almost a fifth using them at least weekly and in-house private investigators' use of data analytics with over a quarter using them at least weekly.

*Table 10. Frequency of use of specialist databases.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

*Table 11. Frequency of the use of data-mining/matching applications.*

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*Table 12. Frequency of the use of cameras.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

*Table 13. Frequency of the use of radio.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

*Table 14. Frequency of the use of covert cameras.*

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*Table 15. Frequency of the use of covert listening devices.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

*Table 16. Frequency of the use of tracking devices.*

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*Table 17. Frequency of the use of bug detectors.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

*Table 18. Frequency of the use of drones.*

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Private investigators have a popular image of the use of specialist equipment such as covert recording and CCTV devices, the use of cameras to name some (Bunyan Citation<sup>1976</sup>, Draper Citation<sup>1978</sup>, Gill and Hart Citation<sup>1997a</sup>). Evidence from the survey found that such tools were rarely used in general, but there were some important differences between the different types of investigators. For almost half of the private investigators, the use of cameras was at least a weekly occurrence, but forensic accountant investigators never used them, and in the public sector in-house, three-quarter never or rarely used them. Private in-house used them more with a quarter using them at least weekly.

Table 13 illustrates that radios were rarely used by all the investigators, with private investigators using them the most with almost a fifth at least weekly. Similarly, covert cameras were also rarely used by private investigators – using these the most with almost a quarter using them at least weekly. All other categories largely never or rarely used them.

Covert listening devices are a very sensitive tool to use, as in many contexts, their use would be illegal. Forensic accountant investigators never used them and they were very rarely used in the in-house public and private sectors. There were around a third of private investigators who used them, ranging from rarely to daily. Tracking devices were used slightly more than covert listening devices – but still, generally for most, it was rare or never.

The sweeping of locations for potential bugs was also a very rarely used tool, with most either never or rarely using such tools. Even for private investigators, their use of at least a monthly level was less than 15%. Similarly, drones are also rarely used. These findings suggest that the use of tools, such as drones, bugging detectors, covert CCTV and listening devices, is in the hands of a few investigators, with most generalists rarely using them.

### **The clients of investigators**

As it is only the private investigators and forensic accountants who have a diversity of clients, the data will focus on them. The responses revealed differences between the two groups. For this, the four-point scale of 1 = frequently, 2 = occasionally, 3 = rarely and 4 = never was used. Forensic accountants who work for public sector organisations are 1.57, SMEs 1.85 and large companies 1.88, the most. Private investigators by contrast work for large companies 1.53, SMEs, 1.56, lawyers 1.71, the most. They also work much more for individual clients scoring 2.08 compared to 3.19 for forensic accountants. The latter work more for charities scoring 2.35, compared to 3.1 for private. Although both groups do occasionally work for the police and security services, it is fairly rare (Table 19).

*Table 19. Who private investigators and forensics work for.*

[Download CSVDisplay Table](#)

### **Outcomes of investigations**

The researchers also sought data on the outcomes of the investigative work of the respondents. There were outliers for some of the categories, but taking into consideration the selected measures of central tendency, in this case, mean, median, minimum and maximum, to be specific, the following can be said. The 78 in-house public investigators who responded to this question reported that an average of around 31% of cases they investigated led to criminal prosecution. The median percentage was 10% – meaning, there were 50% of cases with a percentage value smaller than the median (10%) and 50% of cases with a percentage value larger than the median. The lowest percentage reported by these investigators or minimum that led to criminal prosecution was 0 and the highest reported percentage or maximum percentage was

100%. For the 27 forensic investigators who responded to the question, an average of 27% of cases they investigated led to criminal prosecution with a median percentage value of 5%, a minimum percentage of 0 and a maximum percentage of 100%. The 75 private investigators had similar results with a mean of 24.5% and a median of 10%. The 52 in-house private investigators also had similar results to those derived from the forensic investigators (Table 20).

*Table 20. Percentage of cases that led to a criminal prosecution.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

Alternatives to criminal prosecution such as civil, regulatory or internal discipline are well known as common strategies to deal with some deviant acts (Button *et al.* Citation2018). Again, because of the distortion of high and low scoring cases, it is better to focus on the median. In all four sub categories, around a third to half of the respondents' caseloads resulted in such outcomes, with it being least used in the public sector at just under 30%. All three other categories were around a half (Table 21).

*Table 21. Alternative sanctions.*

[Download CSV](#)[Display Table](#)

To get a picture of the total number of persons experiencing a conviction or loss of job, the survey also sought information on this (Table 22). An important caveat is that it was possible that respondents from the same firm responded about the same cases, which could lead to double counting. Therefore, at best, this is a rough indicator. For criminal convictions, this sample indicates that as many as 2762 were convicted in the courts for a criminal offence as a result of an investigation by the investigators in this survey (mean of 11.51 times 240 who responded to this question). The median number of convictions was highest among public in-house investigators at 3.5, followed by 3 for in-house private investigators, 2 for private investigators and 1.5 for forensic accountant investigators. Given some respondents did not answer this question, the median figure might be more prudent to use. If this figure of 2.5 was applied to an estimated number of investigators of 30,000 (which was discussed

earlier), 75,000 persons could be convicted in the criminal courts over three years as a result of non-police investigations, so possibly 25,000 per year.

*Table 22. Total convictions in courts.*

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For people who had lost employment as a result of a private investigation, the figures were much higher (Table 23). A total of 4325 persons had lost their jobs – with medians of 10 for in-house private investigators and forensic accountant investigators. For private investigators, the figure was 6 and 2 for the in-house public. Again, if the median for all of five was applied to a notional 30,000 investigators, a total of 150,000 persons would have lost employment over a three-year period, giving a figure of 50,000 per year.

*Table 23. Total number of persons whose employment was terminated.*

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Using the Ministry of Justice offender outcome tool (which is an Excel file with extensive outcome on the outcome of offences by crime type), between 2008 and 2018, the total number of offenders proceeded against for criminal offences, added up to between 1.3 and 1.6 million per year (HM Government Citation<sup>2019</sup>). If the focus is property crimes such as theft, fraud (as well as benefit fraud), computer misuse and copyright offences, during the same period, the same numbers proceeded against the range between 68,000 and 144,000 per year. Clearly, many of these would be the sole work of the police, but there are likely to be other offences too beyond this list, which private investigation deal with. So, the figure of 25,000 criminal convictions per year does have some plausibility.

## **Discussion**

This paper has presented exploratory findings on the investigators drawn from clients seeking private investigators, forensic accountants and in-house private and public investigators (who are not the police). There has been very little research in this area and this paper can be considered as an opening account to better understand this aspect of private policing that has largely avoided academic scrutiny. The aim was to provide leads for the authors and other researchers to develop further. Most, but not

all, of the survey data has been presented in this paper and further papers are planned to reveal some of the other interesting findings.

The authors note several issues that arise from these findings that suggest further interesting research. The profile of older private investigators, with a significant number drawn from the police, raises interesting questions over potential networks of information sharing. Do some of the ex-police also represent officers who left the public police under a cloud? An important question to consider, particularly when we come to some of the other findings and an issue previously explored by researchers in some aspects of private policing (O'Reilly and Ellison Citation2006).

The most significant role for many of these investigators is the investigation of fraud. The growth of this crime has put the public police under stress with a thin response to this problem (Levi Citation2017, Loveday Citation2017). This combined with the large number of persons who eventually face criminal prosecution or some other sanction (which are highly likely to be fraud-related) perhaps illustrates that we have effectively seen the privatisation of the criminal investigation of fraud by stealth, without any informed public debate, an issue very few have identified (see Button *et al.* Citation2015, Gottschalk Citation2019).

The use of surveillance by the police has been controversial in the past and not surprisingly stimulated extensive regulation. This research shows that most forms of surveillance are the responsibility of a minority of investigators. However, such tools are used and it is clear that more has to be understood about how this is used, particularly post Leveson, and excesses that were exposed.

Finally, re-enforcing the point about privatisation in this research illustrates investigators' involvement in a significant number of cases that result in significant sanctions. They are involved in facilitating criminal prosecutions (which, often the police claim credit for, i.e. the case is handed to them ready to pursue), pursuing other sanctions through civil courts and regulatory bodies, and private sanctions through the employment justice of organisations. If the median caseloads are multiplied by the number of investigators, the extent of cases is significant. The police role in justice has been subject to extensive scrutiny and regulations, but for this sector, there has been

very little. Indeed, given the scandal in the UK of the in-house private investigation (and prosecution) by the Post Office (a private company in the UK) of 736 postmasters for fraud – of which, at the time of writing 72 have had their convictions overturned (with more expected) and 555 who have received a settlement following civil litigation – it illustrates how miscarriages of justice do not just occur in the public sector (BBC News Citation<sup>2022</sup>). These findings alone point to the need for greater research to understand how these private actors work in this field and where there might be issues of concern, which require further scrutiny and reform.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has presented the findings of an exploratory study on investigators beyond the police, employed as private investigators for forensic accountant firms, for in-house public and private bodies. It has illustrated the profile of them showing generally older males and a second career-orientated group. It has demonstrated what they do showing the significant role in fraud investigation and open source investigations. It has also shown some of the tools they use and the nature and extent of the use of surveillance. The paper has also shown the significant involvement in cases that result in criminal prosecutions and other forms of sanction. Finally, the paper offered some discussion of these findings and suggested some priority areas for further research.

## **Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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## **Sample of analysis**

### **1. Information about the author**

The text under analysis is a scientific paper in the field of criminal law and process entitled «Investigative private policing beyond the police: an exploratory study» and written by the British scientists Mark Button, Richard Kapend (from the University of Portsmouth) and Peter Stiernstedt (from the University of West London).

### **2. Summary**

The given article is dedicated to some issues of determining the essence and specifics of the activities of private investigators (as a collective concept) and is based on a survey of 331 subjects predominantly based or working in the UK. To distinguish the specifics of the work of individual investigator depending on the sector of activity, all subjects are divided into four main groups: private investigators (or detectives), investigators working for forensic accountants, in-house private investigators and in-

house public investigators (non-police). At the same time, without describing in detail the specific features of each of these groups of investigators, the article offers a broad up-to-date picture of investigators' work in the context of several indicators, such as: demography (sex, age); education and qualifications; previous employment and membership in any professional associations. According to the results of the survey, it was established that the most commonly undertaken function by the all groups of private investigators are: fraud investigation, open source intelligence investigations, due diligence investigations, missing person investigations, staff theft and misconduct, corruption-related investigations, cybercrime, money laundering. During investigations, investigators most often use a surveillance, an interviews of persons under caution, a social engineering (blagging), a specialist databases and data-analytical tools (covert recording and listening devices, cameras, radios etc.) as methods and means of their activity. Outcomes of the activities of the studied groups of subjects can be a criminal prosecution, internal disciplinary, civil, regulatory or another alternative sanction.

### **3. Functional style and its aim**

The article under study belongs to the scientific prose style, the main objective of which is to give the reader an understanding of the essence and specifics of the activities of private investigators, based on a survey of professional investigators.

### **4. Compositional structure**

The article has a strict and logical organization and structure. It logically divided into seven parts which are dedicated to general overview of previous research in the area, research methods, results of the study and discussion, conclusion.

### **5. Lexical peculiarities**

The article uses a large number of special terms inherent in the scientific style and field of criminal law and process, such as: private investigators (or detectives), investigators working for forensic accountants, in-house private investigators and in-house public investigators (non-police), fraud investigation etc. In addition, the article has such lexical feature as a quotation, which authors use to confirm their arguments and opinions, and the references has 65 sources.

## **6. Syntactical peculiarities**

Passive structures that are widely used in an article highlighting the impersonal and objective nature of the study. The article also contains many complex sentences and constructions used to build and explain logical connections between phenomena and objects. Given that the article is based on the already conducted survey of investigators, the Past Tenses are used to indicate the answers already provided by respondents.

## **7. The polycode character of the text**

The polycode character of the article is realized in using bar graphs, tables, figures that help the reader to clearly perceive the research materials even without using the main text of the article.

*Choose one of the given articles and write a brief analysis according to the scheme*

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/1365712716674800>

<https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/10/1/4/htm>

<https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-penal-2010-3-page-417.htm>

<https://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ELR/2019/3/ELR-D-18-00021>

## **Unit 5. Legal act. Search-informative, review and analytical reading. Linguistic and terminological processing**

*Read the text below. Specify its lingual features.*

*Write a detailed analysis of the text according to the scheme.*

### **Coronavirus Act 2020 (excerpt)**

11 Indemnity for health service activity: England and Wales (1) The appropriate authority may— (a) indemnify a person in respect of a qualifying liability incurred by the person, or (b) make arrangements for a person to be indemnified, in respect of a qualifying liability incurred by the person, by an authorised person. (2) References in this section to a qualifying liability are to a liability in tort, in respect of or consequent on death, personal injury or loss, arising out of or in connection with a breach of a duty of care owed in connection with the provision, after the coming into force of this section, of a relevant service.

(3) “Relevant service” means a service which is provided by a person as part of the health service and which— (a) relates to— (i) caring for or treating a person who has, or is suspected of having, coronavirus disease, whether or not in respect of that disease, (ii) caring for or treating a person (other than a person within subparagraph (i)) who has been, or is suspected of being, infected or contaminated, in respect of that infection or contamination or suspected infection or contamination, or (iii) diagnosing or determining whether a person has been infected or contaminated, (b) relates to diagnosis, care or treatment and is provided in consequence of another person who usually provides such a service (other than one within paragraph (a)) as part of the health service being unable to do so in consequence of providing a service within paragraph (a), or (c) relates to diagnosis, care or treatment and is provided in consequence of another person who usually provides such a service as part of the health service being unable to do so because of a reason relating to coronavirus. (4) In a case within subsection (1)(a), any question relating to— (a) whether a person has incurred



a qualifying liability, or (b) the amount of any payment by virtue of subsection (1), is to be determined by the appropriate authority. (5) In a case within subsection (1)(b)— (a) any question relating to whether a person has incurred a qualifying liability is to be determined by the authorised person; (b) any question relating to the amount of any payment by virtue of subsection (1) is to be determined by the authorised person in accordance with the arrangements. (6) Subsection (1) does not apply where arrangements are already in place (whether under an insurance policy or otherwise) for the person to be indemnified in respect of the liability. (7) In this section— “the appropriate authority” means— (a) in relation to a relevant service provided as part of the English health service, the Secretary of State; (b) in relation to a relevant service provided as part of the Welsh health service, the Welsh Ministers; “authorised person” means a person authorised by the appropriate authority; “the health service” means the English health service or the Welsh health service; “the English health service” means the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006; “the Welsh health service” means the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.

12 Indemnity for health service activity: Scotland (1) The Scottish Ministers may— (a) indemnify a person in respect of a qualifying liability incurred by the person, or (b) make arrangements for a person to be indemnified, in respect of a qualifying liability incurred by the person, by an authorised person. (2) References in this section to a qualifying liability are to a liability in delict, in respect of or consequent on death, personal injury or loss, arising out of or in connection with a breach of a duty of care owed in connection with the provision, after the coming into force of this section, of a relevant service. (3) “Relevant service” means a service which is provided by a person as part of the health service and which— (a) relates to— (i) caring for or treating a person who has, or is suspected of having, coronavirus disease, whether or not in respect of that disease, (ii) caring for or treating a person (other than a person within subparagraph (i)) who has been, or is suspected of being, infected or contaminated, in respect of that infection or contamination or suspected infection or contamination, or (iii) diagnosing or determining whether a person has been infected or contaminated,

(b) relates to diagnosis, care or treatment and is provided in consequence of another person who usually provides such a service (other than one within paragraph (a)) as part of the health service being unable to do so in consequence of providing a service within paragraph (a), or (c) relates to diagnosis, care or treatment and is provided in consequence of another person who usually provides such a service as part of the health service being unable to do so because of a reason relating to coronavirus. (4) In a case within subsection (1)(a), any question relating to— (a) whether a person has incurred a qualifying liability, or (b) the amount of any payment by virtue of subsection (1), is to be determined by the Scottish Ministers. (5) In a case within subsection (1)(b)— (a) any question relating to whether a person has incurred a qualifying liability is to be determined by the authorised person; (b) any question relating to the amount of any payment by virtue of subsection (1) is to be determined by the authorised person in accordance with the arrangements. (6) Subsection (1) does not apply where arrangements are already in place (whether under an insurance policy or otherwise) for the person to be indemnified in respect of the liability. (7) In this section— “authorised person” means a person authorised by the Scottish Ministers; “the health service” means the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978.

**[Retrieved from <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/7/contents> ]**

### **List of recommended sources**


- 1) Krois-Linder, Amy (and TransLegal). International Legal English. A course for classroom or self-study use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2007. 320 p.
- 2) Bailey S. Academic writing. A handbook of for international students. Third edition. London, New York: Routledge, 2011. 293 p.
- 3) Kate L. Turabian. Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, (Chicago Style for Students and Researchers) 9th Edition. 2019.
- 4) Lin, Angel. 2016. Analysing Academic Texts. 2016. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308189930\\_Analysing\\_Academic\\_Texts](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308189930_Analysing_Academic_Texts)
- 5) Awagu Ifeyinwa. Language in Academic Writing: Features and Topical Issues. Linguistics and Literature Studies. 2021. № 9. 49-56.
- 6) Академічне письмо : навч. посіб. / уклад. С. К. Ревуцька, В. М. Зінченко. Кривий Ріг, 2019. 130 с.
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- 8) Ilchenko O. The language of science: підручник. Київ: Наукова думка, 2010. 288 с.
- 9) <https://learnenglish.britishcouncil.org/skills/writing>
- 10) Educational Resources. International Center for Academic Integrity. URL: <https://www.academicintegrity.org/educational-resources/>  
<https://www.coursera.org/courses?query=academic%20writing>

*Навчальне видання*

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## **АНАЛІЗ НАУКОВОГО / ПРОФЕСІЙНОГО ТЕКСТУ**

*Методичні рекомендації для здобувачів вищої освіти  
III (освітньо-наукового) ступеня  
юридичних спеціальностей*



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